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“Yale’s Reader’s Guide to the 25th Amendment is, quite simply, indispensable. There 
is no better single resource on this crucial, and widely misunderstood, corner of 
American law and politics.” – Evan Osnos, The New Yorker
“The text of the 25th Amendment seems clear on its face, but its provisions raise 
many questions. The authors of this indispensable reader’s guide have performed 
a great public service for members of the executive departments who might 
trigger its provisions, for legislators who would then vote on their decision, for 
members of the media who would have to report on what was happening, and 
for citizens who would eventually cast their verdict in the next election.”  
– Richard M. Pious, Professor of Political Science, Barnard College & Columbia University, Author of 
The President, Congress and the Constitution (1984) and Why Presidents Fail (2008).
“The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution: A Reader’s 
Guide,” provides a clear-eyed roadmap to navigate one of the most controversial, 
and unexpected, political issues the country faces. The Reader’s Guide is not only a 
critical scholarly contribution but is also an invaluable tool for political and policy 
experts looking for actionable analysis at a moment when the executive branch 
consistently tests the constitution’s resilience.” –John Podesta, White House Chief of Staff, 
1998-2001; Counselor to the President, 2014-2015
 
“The Twenty-Fifth Amendment is an extraordinarily important and little under-
stood part of our Constitution. This guide explains all of its nuances in a lively and 
readable fashion.” – Norman Ornstein, The American Enterprise Institute
“Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is silent or vague on a variety of pertinent 
issues. This ‘reader’s guide’ provides an important public service by systematically 
laying out those issues and proposing practical resolutions. Should Section 4 ever be 
invoked, it will quickly become a prominent ‘user’s guide’ as well.” 
– David Pozen, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
“This ‘Reader’s Guide’ presents a thoughtful and comprehensive discussion of  
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. It should prove a 
very valuable resource for government officials seeking to implement the provision 
correctly, for scholars and journalists seeking to explain it, and for citizens committed 
to the rule of law and accountable government.”  
– Joel K. Goldstein, Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.
“At some future time we will probably need to invoke the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment’s provisions on presidential removal. When that time comes, we  
will all be grateful for this comprehensive and thought-provoking analysis of  
every aspect of the Amendment. This work is absolutely indispensable and  
should be widely studied.” – Larry Sabato, Director of the Center for Politics and University 
Professor of Politics, University of Virginia.
“This is a first-rate primer about the 25th Amendment. A valuable study for all  
citizens who are interested in understanding how the 25th Amendment works  
and its history.” - Julian E. Zelizer, Malcolm Stevenson Forbes, Class of 1941 Professor of History 
and Public Affairs, Princeton.
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EX EC UTI VE SU M M ARY  
 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution addresses what happens if 
the President or Vice President of the United States is removed, dies, resigns, or in the case of 
the President, is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office. 
 
In particular, the Amendment addresses: 
 
• filling a vacancy in the office of the President in case of removal, death, or resignation of 
the President (Section 1); 
 
• filling a vacancy in the office of the Vice President (Section 2); 
 
• the transfer of presidential powers and duties to the Vice President where the  
President has declared himself unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office 
(Section 3); 
 
• the transfer of presidential powers and duties to the Vice President where the Vice 
President and either a majority of the Principal Officers of the Executive Departments 
or “such other body as Congress may by law provide” have determined that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office (Section 4). 
 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment has been largely overlooked by history, but in recent months has 
drawn increased attention in the media and popular culture.1 While its potential for human 
drama has been explored in detail, its legal requirements and implications remain poorly 
understood, and have been misstated even by experienced legal commentators.2 This is in part 
because the Amendment has received little judicial and scholarly attention. The relative 
sparseness of the Amendment’s interpretive development is especially striking given the 
gravity of its subject: the removal from power of the elected head of the Executive Branch.  
 
Among the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Section 4—which provides for 
situations where the President cannot or will not recognize his own inability—is particularly 
momentous and little understood. In the more than 50 years since the Amendment’s 
ratification, Section 4 has never been invoked. There are no judicial or other authoritative 
opinions directly evaluating its proper implementation. Unlike other constitutional processes 
involving the office of the President, such as impeachment or even other sections of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, there is no historical practice to guide its employment.  As a result, 
uncertainty persists about such basic questions as when Section 4 can or should be invoked, 
who would make important decisions, and how Section 4’s processes should be implemented.  
 
  
                                               
1 See, e.g., Homeland: Clarity (Showtime television broadcast Apr. 15, 2018); Madam Secretary: Sound and Fury (CBS 
television broadcast Jan. 14, 2018); Designated Survivor: Warriors (ABC television broadcast Mar. 8, 2017); House of 
Cards: Chapter 43, NETFLIX (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.netflix.com/watch/80049215; Madam Secretary: The Show 
Must Go On (CBS television broadcast Oct. 4, 2015); The West Wing: Twenty-Five (NBC television broadcast May 
14, 2003); 24: Day 2: 4:00 a.m. – 5:00 a.m.; (Fox television broadcast Apr. 29, 2003). 
2 See, e.g., infra notes 68, 187. 
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This “Reader’s Guide” seeks to provide guidance on these critical interpretive questions. 
Drawing on the constitutional text, legislative debates, and scholarly analyses, it seeks to 
provide a road map for the faithful application of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. In 
preparing this Guide, we have relied heavily on several critical sources: (1) the Final Report of 
the Miller Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment; (2) the 
work of the Fordham University School of Law’s Clinic on Presidential Succession, most recently 
reflected in a Symposium issue on the fiftieth anniversary of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
entitled “Continuity in the Presidency: Gaps and Solutions,” 86 Fordham Law Review 907 (Vol. 3 
December 2017); and (3) the lifetime’s work of Professor John D. Feerick, past Dean of the 
Fordham University School of Law, who was a principal drafter of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
and continues to be its preeminent commentator. 
To several of the questions addressed in this document, we find no single, unequivocal answer. 
In such cases, the Guide sets out what we believe to be the prevailing view. Where we find no 
prevailing view, we offer our best reading of the principles that should guide the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment’s faithful implementation. To be clear, we offer no opinion on the merits of any 
particular decision to exercise—or not to exercise—the Amendment’s provisions. Our purpose 
is only to provide clarity to those who may be confronted with a potential question of 
implementation as to how best to make their decisions following the spirit and letter of the 
Amendment.  
Throughout, this Reader’s Guide is motivated by the recognition that issues of presidential 
inability raise questions of the utmost gravity. Particularly at moments of constitutional stress, 
fidelity to the rule of law and its principles of consistent and faithful interpretation become all 
the more essential. This requires a conscientious adherence—and careful attention—to the 
Amendment’s text, drafting and legislative history, and other sources of constitutional 
meaning. 
With these precepts in mind, we provide the following analysis of this little-understood, often 
misinterpreted, and highly important constitutional provision.  
  6 
TEXT OF  TH E T W ENT Y-FI FTH  A M END M ENT  
 
SECTION 1 
In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice 
President shall become President. 
 
 
SECTION 2 
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a 
Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of 
Congress. 
 
 
SECTION 3 
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the 
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the 
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. 
 
 
SECTION 4 
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written 
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting 
President. Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, 
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of 
either the principal officers of the executive department[s]3 or of such other body as Congress 
may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the 
issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, 
within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in 
session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-
thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of 
his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; 
otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.  
 
  
                                               
3 This word was meant to read “departments”; the missing “s” was a scrivener’s error that escaped timely detection. 
See John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: A Personal Remembrance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1075, 1101 (2017). 
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SU M M ARY OF  FI NDING S 
 
• Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment may be “activated” by the Vice President along 
with a majority vote of one of two groups:  either (1) the Principal Officers of the executive 
departments, or (2) an “other body” enacted by Congress through bicameralism and 
presentment. 
 
o If Congress creates an “other body,” that body supplants the Principal Officers as the 
entity that, together with the Vice President, may trigger the Section 4 process. The 
choice is “either/or,” not “both/and.” 
o The Principal Officers of the Executive Departments are not what is colloquially known 
as the President’s “Cabinet.” Rather, they are the heads of the fifteen departments 
named in 5 U.S.C. § 101, not all cabinet officers. Thus, a majority of the Principal Officers 
would be eight. This means that, including the Vice President, nine U.S. officials acting in 
concert could declare the President unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office under Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
o Acting heads of departments may vote on presidential inability as Principal Officers of 
Executive Departments. 
o If Congress chooses to create the “other body” mentioned in Section 4, Congress may 
compose that body however it likes, subject to constitutional limitations. However, the 
framers of the Amendment indicated a strong preference against the “other body” being 
composed exclusively of medical experts. 
• There is no specific threshold—medical or otherwise—for the “inability” contemplated in 
Section 4.  
 
o The framers specifically rejected any definition of the term, prioritizing flexibility. Those 
implementing Section 4 should focus on whether—in an objective sense taking all of the 
circumstances into account—the President is “unable to discharge the powers and 
duties” of the office. 
• The Amendment does not require that any particular type or amount of evidence be 
submitted to determine that the President is unable to perform his duties.  
 
o While the framers did imagine that medical evidence would be helpful to the 
determination of whether the President is unable, neither medical expertise nor 
diagnosis is required for a determination of inability.  
o The “Goldwater Rule,” which suggests that psychiatrists may not opine on the mental 
health of a patient they have not examined, is unlikely to present a significant obstacle 
to the implementation of the Amendment. (We offer no opinion on the merits of the 
Goldwater Rule itself.) 
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• While the Vice President serves as Acting President, as a legal matter, the Vice President 
wields all the powers of the Presidency. 
 
o Once an initial transmission of “inability” is made by the Vice President and the Principal 
Officers or “other body,” the Vice President immediately becomes Acting President. The 
Vice President remains Acting President during the four-day period following a 
President’s declaration of “no inability” and throughout the period of congressional 
convening and deliberation on the matter, which may last another twenty-one days. 
o During this time, the machinery of the Executive Branch—including the White House 
Counsel and the Department of Justice—serves the Acting President, not the President.  
o If the Section 4 process concludes with the President being declared unable, the Vice 
President remains Acting President, but does not assume the Office of the Presidency or 
the title of “President.” 
• Congress is not required to adhere to any specific set of procedures or burden of proof 
during its deliberations. 
 
o The vote required by the Amendment is a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress—
not two-thirds of the total members of both Houses. 
o Congress may exercise compulsory process over the President. Medical privacy laws 
such as the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the 
constitutional doctrine of executive privilege, and state law doctrines of attorney-client 
privilege are unlikely to present significant obstacles to the gathering of evidence 
needed for implementation of the Amendment. 
o The President may make his case to Congress that he is able to resume his powers  
and duties. 
o Depending on the circumstances, actions taken by the President or other officials to 
frustrate the Twenty-Fifth Amendment process may constitute an impeachable 
offense. 
• Almost all challenges to any element of an implementation of Section 4 of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment are highly likely to be considered unreviewable by the courts. 
 
o A challenge to the merits of a determination of presidential inability is most likely to be 
deemed unreviewable as a nonjusticiable political question. 
o Almost all challenges to the procedures used in an implementation of Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment are likely to be unreviewable as nonjusticiable political 
questions; for prudential reasons, the judicial branch is highly unlikely to intervene 
absent patent and material departures from the procedures expressly specified by the 
text of the Amendment. 
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• There is no limit to the number of times Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment may 
be implemented.
o The President may resume the powers and duties of the Presidency if he is found to be
able to discharge them.
o If the Section 4 process concludes with the President being declared unable, the 
President may still be impeached.
o If the President regains the powers and duties of the Presidency, the President may
dismiss cabinet officials for declaring him unable.
  10 
AN ALY SI S  
 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was adopted on February 10, 1967. It superseded and 
augmented Article II, Section 1, Clause 6 of the U.S. Constitution. That clause had provided that 
the powers and duties of the presidency devolve to the Vice President in the case of the 
removal, death, resignation, or inability of the President, and that “Congress may by Law provide 
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice 
President.” It did not, however, indicate by what procedures or standards that devolution would 
take place, or precisely how official inability would be determined.  
 
By supplementing this prior constitutional provision, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was meant 
to settle long-disputed questions related to presidential succession, and to provide a 
constitutional mechanism that would ensure the orderly transition of power in the cases of 
presidential removal, death, resignation, or inability. During previous episodes of presidential 
incapacity, the absence of a constitutional mechanism for effecting the transfer of the powers 
and duties of the Presidency had resulted either in the failure to exercise that transfer, or in such 
a transfer being arranged informally in a manner not constitutionally endorsed.4 
 
In the sections that follow, we provide an analysis of a number of questions regarding the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s proper implementation. We do so with a particular focus on 
Section 4 of the Amendment, which has not been invoked since its ratification. 
 
A note on interpretive methods regarding the U.S. Constitution: American constitutional 
practice is commonly acknowledged to be pluralistic in nature. 5  Scholars continue to 
debate the merits and proper role of various interpretive methods, especially originalism.6 
However, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, in several respects, is a rare constitutional 
provision. First, there has been virtually no judicial doctrine interpreting or government 
practice applying it. Second, outside Congress, there was little recorded public debate of 
numerous questions to which this Reader’s Guide is addressed. Third, and helpfully, the 
Amendment has unusually accessible and robust drafting and legislative histories. For all 
of these reasons, this Reader’s Guide relies particularly on the text, drafting and legislative 
history of the Amendment in evaluating its proper implementation. We believe these are 
the best available sources of evidence for the Amendment’s meaning, and that based on 
this evidence, our conclusions are reliable interpretations. 
 
  
                                               
4 See discussion infra Section II.A.2 for examples. 
5 See generally, PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). 
6 See e.g., JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); Jamal Greene, Rule Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639 (2016); Vicki 
C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094 (2015); Michael J. Perry, The Legitimacy 
of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669 (1991). 
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I. Who Can Activate Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment? 
 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment describes two methods by which Section 4 may be set into 
motion. First, Section 4 empowers the Vice President and a majority of the “principal officers of 
the executive departments” (“Principal Officers”)—at present, a minimum of nine (Vice 
President plus eight) executive officials acting together—to declare the President unable to 
discharge his powers and duties. A second, alternative method would require the approval of 
the Vice President and any “such other body as Congress may by law provide” (“other body”).7 
 
Significantly, under either scenario—Principal Officers or “other body”—the Vice President is the 
indispensable actor in the activation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. It is not only that the 
Vice President’s participation is required for either method of activation, whether with the 
Principal Officers or the “other body.” The Vice President must also be prepared to assume the 
role and responsibility of Acting President. The Vice President is also highly likely to be 
indispensable to coordinating the collective action of the Principal Officers, as discussed in  
Part I.C. 
 
A. Action by the Vice President and “Principal Officers of the Executive 
Department” 
 
1. What is an Executive Department? 
While the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not define “executive department,” the legislative 
history makes clear that the language refers to those departments named in 5 U.S.C. § 101. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has endorsed this conclusion in dicta.8 The legislative debates show that 
ten officials were originally intended—the Secretaries of State; Treasury; Defense, Interior; 
Agriculture; Commerce; Labor; and Health, Education and Welfare; the Attorney General, and 
the Postmaster General—along with the head of any executive department established after 
July 1965.9 The House Report accompanying the joint resolution proposing the Amendment 
stated the same conclusion: 
  
                                               
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, §4. Some have suggested this section was structured to mirror Article II, Section 1, Clause 
6 which states that “the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both 
of the President and Vice President.” BERT E. PARK, AILING, AGING, ADDICTED: STUDIES OF COMPROMISED LEADERSHIP 204 
(1993) (emphasis added). The Principal Officers were chosen as the default group for initiating Section 4’s 
implementation out of special concern for the separation of powers. See JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE 
STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 251 (1965) (discussing the ABA drafting committee’s rejection of the Supreme 
Court or Congress as the default group and its selection of the Executive Officers in part because their “involvement 
would be consistent with the principle of separation of powers”); see also James C. Kirby, Jr., A Breakthrough on 
Presidential Inability: The ABA Conference Consensus, 17 VAND. L. REV. 463, 477 (1964) (explaining that the ABA’s 
choice of the Executive Officers as the default group “reflect[ed] a widely held opinion that this decision should be 
within the executive branch, respecting the separation of powers and insuring that the decision is made by persons 
in close proximity to the President and presumably loyal to him”). 
8  Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 887 n.4 (1991) (noting that in interpreting the 
Appointments Clause, the Court is not bound by “the fact that the [Twenty-Fifth] Amendment strictly limits the 
term ‘department’ to those departments named in 5 U.S.C. § 101”). 
9 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Waggonner); id at 7941 (Statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 7944-45 
(Statement of Rep. Whitener); id at 7954 (Statement of Rep. Gilbert); JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH 
AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 117 (2014). 
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The intent of the committee is that the Presidential appointees who direct the 
10 executive departments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive department 
established in the future, generally considered to comprise the President’s 
Cabinet, would participate, with the Vice President, in determining inability. 10 
 
As of February 2018, 5 U.S.C. § 101 provides that there are fifteen executive departments,11 
making eight a majority of the Principal Officers: 
 
The Department of State 
The Department of the Treasury 
The Department of Defense 
The Department of Justice 
The Department of the Interior 
The Department of Agriculture 
The Department of Commerce 
The Department of Labor 
The Department of Health and Human Services 
The Department of Housing and Urban Development 
The Department of Transportation 
The Department of Energy 
The Department of Education 
The Department of Veterans Affairs 
The Department of Homeland Security 
 
Despite the legislative history’s references to the “President’s Cabinet,” the Principal Officers of 
the Executive Departments and the Cabinet are not necessarily the same. For the purposes of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it is specifically the executive departments—not the Cabinet 
status of an official—that matter.12   
 
Senator Birch Bayh, one of the principal drafters of the Amendment, drew this distinction during 
hearings before the House Judiciary Committee. For example, one questioner noted that within 
the Department of Defense, “we have the Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air 
Force, the Department of the Army,” and asked whether the Principal Officers of these 
departments—that is, the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force—would be Principal 
Officers for the purpose of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. In response, Senator Bayh explained 
                                               
10 H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 3 (1965) (emphasis added). 
11 See also Pub. L. 89–554,  80 Stat. 378 (1966); Pub. L. 89–670, § 10(b), 80 Stat. 948 (1966); Pub. L. 91–375, § 6(c)(1), 84 
Stat. 775 (1970); Pub. L. 95–91, § 710(a), 91 Stat. 609 (1977); Pub. L. 96–88, § 508(b), 93 Stat. 692 (1979); Pub. L. 100–
527, § 13(b), 102 Stat. 2643 (1988); Pub. L. 109–241, § 902(a)(1), 120 Stat. 566 (2006). 
12  For this reason, throughout this Reader’s Guide we will refer to “the principal officers of the executive 
departments” as “the Principal Officers”—not “the Cabinet”—except when reproducing a quotation. 
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that they would not.13 Another questioner noted that, at the time of the hearing—and as is still 
the case today— “the Ambassador [to] the United Nations sits with and as a member of the 
Cabinet.” “I understand,” the questioner continued, that “some other executive officers, 
including the head of the poverty program, Mr. Shriver, is also sitting as a member of the 
Cabinet,” before questioning whether these individuals should be included in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment process.14 In response, Senator Bayh said that while the “Cabinet . . . could very well 
be interpreted to include” officials like the U.S. Representative to the United Nations and the 
Director of the Poverty Program, these officials were not intended to be included among the 
“principal officers of the executive departments.”15 
2. Can acting heads of Executive Departments
participate?
Yes. The “principal officers” of the executive 
departments are understood from the legislative 
history to be the Presidential appointees who direct 
the executive departments named in 5 U.S.C. § 101.16  
Congressional debates regarding the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment indicate that a recess appointee to a 
principal officer position would be able to participate 
in the determination of inability.17 
However, leading up to the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, there was some debate 
as to whether the acting heads of the executive departments should participate in the process 
created by the Amendment. The House Judiciary Committee report established that they 
should, noting, “In the case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any 
executive department, the acting head of the department would be authorized to participate 
in a presidential inability determination.”18 This view was later echoed by then-Senator Robert 
F. Kennedy in a floor debate on June 30, 1965, 19  and assumed by other senators during 
subsequent discussions concerning the firing and replacement of Cabinet members.20
13 Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 52 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House 
Judiciary Hearings]. 
14 Id. at 60-61. 
15 Id. at 61. 
16 H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 3 (1965) (emphasis added). 
17 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id at 15,382 (statement of Sen. Kennedy); id at 15,385 
(statement of Sen. Javits). 
18 H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 3 (1965). 
19 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965). 
20 Id. at 15,382 (statement of Sen. Kennedy), 15,385 (statement of Sen. Javits). In Senate debates on February 19, 1965, 
Sen. Bayh stated that, in the event of a vacancy in the office of the Secretary, an Under Secretary would not be 
“empowered as would the Secretary himself, in participating in the decision with respect to ability or disability.” 111 
CONG. REC. 3284 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hart; statement of Sen. Bayh). However, this statement was made during 
a colloquy about which officers are “heads of executive departments” – not a discussion about vacancies. Id. A 
memorandum from the Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service was introduced into the Senate record to 
clarify that subdivision and bureau heads are not “heads of executive departments.” Id. at 3283. Dean Feerick has 
written that he believes the view of the House Judiciary Committee to be the correct one. FEERICK, supra note 9, at 
118. 
Congressional debates 
regarding the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment indicate that a 
recess appointee to a principal 
officer position would be able  
to participate in the 
determination of inability. 
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3. Can the Vice President trigger Section 4 with a simple majority of the Principal 
Officers? 
Yes. It is clear on the face of the Amendment that the Vice President may trigger Section 4 if 
supported by a simple majority of the Principal Officers. In some situations, the Vice President 
might seek a consensus of the Principal Officers, or at least a number greater than a bare 
majority. In other circumstances, however, the Vice President might not. Where there might be 
dissenters who would warn a potentially disabled President, triggering dismissals of Principal 
Officers and thereby short-circuiting the Section 4 process, the Vice President might act with 
more secrecy until a majority of Principal Officers is obtained and the first declaration is 
transmitted. It is also noteworthy that the Amendment specifies no role for the White House 
Chief of Staff, although that individual would likely play an important role in attesting to the 
President’s inability and/or organizing the Principal Officers.  
 
B. Action by the Vice President and “Such Other Body as Congress May by Law 
Provide”  
 
As noted, Section 4 provides that Congress can create an alternative “other body” in lieu of the 
“principal officers of the executive departments” for setting into motion the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. This alternative maintains the Vice President as the indispensable actor, but 
requires him instead to act with any “such other body as Congress may by law provide”21 (the 
“other body”). 
 
1. What are the procedural requirements for the creation of the “other body”? 
There are only two clear requirements for the creation of the other body mentioned in Section 
4.  First, the act creating the body must be approved like any other statute, meeting the 
requirements of bicameralism and presentment. Section 4 clearly states that the body must be 
created “by law,”22 and the legislative history makes it clear that the President has a veto power 
over the statute creating the body.23  
 
Second, the other body, once created, must act as the exclusive mechanism—acting along with 
the Vice President—for initiating Section 4. This conclusion finds support in the legislative 
history. During congressional debates, some worried that creating an exclusive body would be 
unconstitutional because it would encroach on the Principal Officers’ constitutionally 
appointed power to ascertain the President’s fitness. Senator Jacob Javits, however, rejected 
this concern and stated that, under the Amendment, Congress definitely possesses the plenary 
power to replace the Principal Officers with another body. 24  Moreover, Senators Bayh and 
Javits, and Dean John D. Feerick, a principal architect of the Amendment, all asserted that 
                                               
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
22 Id. 
23  FEERICK, supra note 9, at 121; see also, Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, Report of the Commission on Presidential 
Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, WHITE BURKETT MILLER CTR. PUB. AFF. 13 (1988), 
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=twentyfifth_amendment_reports (“Such 
congressional action would be subject to presidential veto as any other legislation, and a veto could be overridden 
by a two-thirds vote of both houses”). 
24 111 CONG. REC. 15,385-86 (1965) (responding to concerns that Congress cannot enact a law that conflicts with a 
Constitutional provision giving the Cabinet certain powers, Javits affirms that “Congress has the right to provide for 
the exclusivity of that body in exercising this authority . . . . [W]ould it not be completely contrary to create the two 
bodies which could compete with one another. . .[I]f the Congress were to exercise the authority that the amendment 
would give, the courts would hold that such a body has exclusivity to its action.”). 
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whenever Congress designates such a body, it replaces the Principal Officers.25 When asked 
whether a Vice President has a choice between the other body and the Principal Officers, 
Senator Bayh stated:  
 
I would think not. In the first place, the Congress has a choice of either providing 
another body or permitting the Cabinet to continue to function. This is 
abundantly clear in the language as I read it. If Congress finds that the Cabinet 
cannot adequately fill this role, then it provides an alternative body which will 
function. This is the way we intended it. This is the way most all of us look at it 
and the way I would like to read in the record.26 
 
Under this reading, once Congress creates another body, the Principal Officers no longer play a 
role in the Amendment process,27 assuming the Principal Officers are not part of the body 
created by Congress. It also appears that Congress, if it so chooses, can create a temporary 
“other body” that exercises Section 4 powers for a limited period of time unless reauthorized.”28 
 
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment intended to provide Congress the ability to 
create an “other body” in the event that the Principal Officers proved to be dysfunctional.29 
Dysfunction could arise in a number of circumstances; for instance, if the Principal Officers 
deadlocked in a tie vote.30 Congress might also want to create an “other body” if the President 
chose to fire all of the Principal Officers to prevent them from declaring him unable.31 However, 
while framers like Senator Bayh believed Congress should only create another body when 
absolutely necessary,32 nothing in the Constitution’s text itself requires that Congress only 
create an “other body” in dire circumstances.  
                                               
25 Id. at 15,383-86; FEERICK, supra note 9, at 121. 
26 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 93. 
27  Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 12.; Birch Bayh, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Dealing with 
Presidential Disability, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 437, 446 (1995) (“The language of the amendment clearly requires that 
the ‘other body’ will replace the Cabinet. Specifically, either the Cabinet or the ‘other body,’ together with the Vice 
President, will decide upon presidential disability.”); Feerick, supra note 3, at 1100–1101 (discussing research and 
correspondence with framers regarding “either/or” formulation ensuring this result). 
28  Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 13 (The Commission first considers whether to propose that 
Congress create a permanent body to replace the Cabinet and concludes that the Cabinet would be a better default 
advisory body than any other body created by Congress. The Commission also considers the alternative option of 
creating a temporary body: “Even if Congress does not create a permanent body of this sort, this provision in Section 
4 is salutary in that it gives Congress power to act if, in a particular situation, the Cabinet fails to act when it is clear 
that the president is unable to carry out his duties. Congress could create another body to take action in that special 
situation. Such congressional action would be subject to presidential veto as any other legislation, and a veto could 
be overridden by a two-thirds vote of both houses. Such a body would be temporary and created to deal specifically 
with one assignment, leaving the Cabinet in place to address situations thereafter.”). 
29 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 120; see also, HERBERT L. ABRAMS, THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT: CONFUSION, DISABILITY, AND 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RONALD REAGAN 175 (1992); BIRCH 
BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 50 (1968) (“[I]n the event of Presidential 
disability, [Section 4] would enable Congress to provide by law for some other body to replace the Cabinet as the 
group responsible for verifying the action of the Vice President in the event the Cabinet’s presence in the disability 
provision proved unworkable.”). For additional recommendations for improving Section 4’s function, see Fordham 
University School of Law Second Clinic on Presidential Succession, Report, Fifty Years After the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment: Recommendations for Improving the Presidential Succession System, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 917 (2017). 
30 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff). 
31 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 121. 
32 Bayh, supra note 27, at 446 (“The legislative history is clear. Congress intended that ‘the other body’ should be 
designated only if the Cabinet, for political reasons or otherwise, becomes a roadblock to resolving a presidential 
disability.”); see also 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 45 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (By including the 
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2. What limits, if any, are there on the powers and composition of the “other body”?  
The Amendment affords Congress considerable flexibility in designing the body’s powers, 
procedures, and composition. 33  Congress may prescribe the body’s rules and procedures, 
subject only to constitutional restraint.34 Congressional debate suggests that Congress could 
even designate itself as a whole the “body” in question.35 The body could also consist of Cabinet 
members.36 During the ratification debate, some suggested including particular members of the 
judiciary or senior congressional figures such as the Chief Justice or majority and minority 
leaders.37 Some have even proposed that the “other body” consist of “medical doctors, either 
appointed for terms or designated by office (e.g. the surgeon general).”38 Indeed, according to 
one commission studying the Twenty Fifth Amendment, only “[t]he realities of American 
politics and public opinion, and [a] sense of ‘constitutional morality’ . . .” limit who Congress may 
designate as the “other body.”39  
  
In addition, there are two concrete constitutional limits on the other body’s composition and 
actions: (1) the body’s declaration that the President is unable to discharge his or her duties has 
no legal effect without the Vice President’s approval, and (2) at least a majority of the other 
body must approve of such a declaration for it to trigger a transfer of power.40 This means that 
                                               
“other body” option, “[w]e also provide for the unforeseen contingency that the Cabinet may not prove to be the 
best body to determine presidential inability in conjunction with the Vice President.”) 
33 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 121. (“The debates make clear that Congress’s power with respect to the creation of 
‘another body’ is vast. It can designate itself, expand or restrict the membership of the Cabinet, combine the Cabinet 
with other officials, require a unanimous vote of the body established by law, and prescribe rules of procedure to be 
followed by that body.”); see also ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 175 (1991); BAYH, supra note 29, at 50 (“Some scholars and 
members of Congress had felt that the only body which could make an impartial decision concerning the President’s 
disability was a blue-ribbon commission. According to some, this commission ought to be composed of doctors; 
according to others, it should contain doctors, members of the Supreme Court, and legislative leaders from Congress. 
This minor change in the language would leave the way open for Congress to establish such a commission to replace 
the Cabinet at a later date if necessary.”) 
34 111 CONG. REC. 15,386 (1965) (statement of Sen. Javits) (“Congress has the right to provide for . . . the way in which 
the body shall exercise that authority, and other pertinent details necessary to the creation of such a body, its 
continuance, its way of meeting, the rules of the procedure, and the way in which it shall exercise its power”). For 
further discussion of constitutional restraints on Congress’ freedom to prescribe the procedures of the “other body,” 
see infra note 40. 
35 111 CONG. REC. 7957 (1965) (statement of Rep. Tenzer) (“[I]t would vest the Congress with the power to require 
concurrence by a body other than the Cabinet. In fact, the Congress could designate itself as the body to grant or 
withhold concurrence.”). 
36 111 CONG. REC. 15,385 (1965) (Statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 7941 (Statement of Rep. Poff) (“Congress may sometime 
find it necessary to name some ‘other body’ which of course it could do simply by adding to the Cabinet as the 
decision-making body one non-Cabinet member.”). 
37 111 CONG. REC. 7,957 (1965) (statement of Rep. Tenzer) (“In fact, the Congress could designate itself as the body to 
grant or withhold concurrence.”); id. at 15,382 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“This would not preclude Congress, in its 
wisdom, from establishing another panel, perhaps of the majority and minority leaders of both Houses, the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court.”); id. at 7,942 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (“[T]he suggestion has been made that a 
commission be created which might be composed of Supreme Court jurists, elected leaders of Congress, and 
members of the Cabinet.”); see also, Miller Center Commission No. 4, supra note 23 at 13. 
38 Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 13; see also Bayh, supra note 27, at 447 (noting but critiquing the 
notion that a panel of medical experts should comprise the other body); PARK, supra note 7, at 206 (calling for “a 
Presidential Disability Commission” enacted as the “other body” to advise the Vice President and the Cabinet on 
presidential disability); ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 246-48 (suggesting that medical experts might serve on the other 
body). 
39 Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 13. 
40  Id. at 14. There is some evidence in the early legislative history indicating that the Amendment’s framers 
contemplated allowing Congress to change the “majority . . . of” textual requirement as applied to the other body.  
See, e.g., 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 254 (former Attorney General Brownell is asked whether 
unanimity or only a majority would be required if Congress creates an other body. He responds: “I think in such case 
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the other body substitutes only for the role of the “Principal Officers”; the body cannot replace 
the Vice President’s constitutionally mandated role in the process.41  
Additionally, the ordinary meaning of the word “body”—a word that connotes “a group of 
persons”—strongly suggests that the other body must consist of more than one individual.42 
While it does not seem that Congress discussed this particular requirement during the drafting 
process, legislators typically discussed the body as being composed of at least two individuals.43 
Similarly, the word “majority” implies that a tie vote between equally divided members of the 
other body would not suffice to provide the necessary majority needed to trigger Section 4. 
Although the legislators do not seem to have contemplated a tie vote of the other body, one 
Senator suggested that the other body could be created for the purpose of breaking a tie vote 
of the Principal Officers.44 This statement in turn implies that Congress considered a tie vote of 
either the Principal Officers or the other body not to constitute a majority. Additionally, the 
ordinary legal usage of the word “majority” suggests that it is a “number more than half of a 
total.”45  
Nonetheless, some scholars have questioned whether it is appropriate for certain individuals to 
serve on the other body. For example, the University of Virginia’s Miller Center Commission’s 
Report on Presidential Disability strongly recommended against involving members of the 
Judiciary in what is, by nature, a political process.46  
the Congress could by law provide for it either way.” But crucially, this was asked at a time when the House Joint 
Resolution was differently worded and ambiguous as to whether “the majority” referred to the other body). 
However, the Amendment’s final text makes clear that if an other body is created, the Vice President must act with 
a majority of that body to trigger Section 4. Furthermore, interpreting the Amendment to preclude Congress from 
changing the majority requirement for the other body would ensure the constitutionality of its application. If 
Congress were to create an “other body,” that body would supplant the Principal Officers as the only group that can 
act with the Vice President to trigger the Amendment. Thus, allowing Congress to change the majority requirement 
could potentially allow it to frustrate the basic purposes of the Amendment—e.g., by creating a large body and then 
mandating unanimity, making Section 4 almost impossible to initiate, or by lowering the threshold for action to .0001 
percent, thereby essentially giving the Vice President the power to act alone. 
41 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 121; see also 111 CONG. REC. 15,379, 15,383-86, 15,586-96 (1965) (statements of Senator Bayh) 
(noting the necessity of the Vice President’s involvement in the Section 4 process). 
42 Body, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2017), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/body (“a group of 
persons or things: such as . . . a group of individuals organized for some purpose”); see also Body, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “body” in the non-corporate-law context as “[a]n aggregate of individuals or 
groups,” “[a] deliberative assembly,” and “[a]n aggregate of individuals or groups”). 
43 See, e.g., 1111 CONG. REC. 7,942 (1965); id. at 7,957; id. at 15,342; Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of 
Vice President: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th 
Cong. 52 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Subcomm. Hearings].
44 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (“Presently, the Cabinet as defined in title 5, United States Code, 
section 1 consists of 10 members. It is possible that an even-numbered Cabinet might divide evenly, thus effectively 
stultifying the system erected in section 4. For this reason, or some other good reason, Congress may sometime find 
it necessary to name some ‘other body’ which of course it could do simply by adding to the Cabinet as the decision-
making body one non-Cabinet member.”). 
45 Majority, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “majority” in the voting context as “[a] number that is 
more than half of a total; a group of more than 50 percent . . . A majority always refers to more than half of some 
defined or assumed set.”) 
46 Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 13 (“The Commission strongly believes that the chief justice and 
other members of the Supreme Court should have no role in any such body or in any other fashion under the terms of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The late Chief Justice Earl Warren advised strongly against any such role during 
deliberations in Congress on the Amendment, and former Chief Justice Warren Burger took the same position in 
speaking to the Commission. The Commission considers it essential to keep the judicial role separate lest, in a 
situation perhaps now unimaginable, the Supreme Court might be called to rule on some application of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.”). In fact, regarding similar proposals made in the late 1950s, Chief Justice Warren suggested that 
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 Similarly, despite calls for Congress to create a medical 
panel to advise the Vice President, 47  there exists 
considerable opposition to the “other body” being 
comprised entirely of medical professionals. 48  For 
instance, in a 1995 law review article, Senator Bayh 
doubted the effectiveness of such a medical panel.49 He 
took the view that a body composed of medical 
professionals would not necessarily be less political, 
because political enemies would inevitably take 
advantage of dissenting medical judgment in the case of 
any non-unanimous outcome; that such a medical 
commission could lack political legitimacy and 
accountability; that it might not have consistent enough 
exposure to the President to form a professionally 
reliable diagnosis; and last and most important, that it 
would not be well suited to consider the various political 
factors relevant to the decision, including assessing 
alternatives and the gravity of the governmental 
circumstances at the time. 50  Still, even Senator Bayh 
admitted that Congress could create a medical panel, although he noted that inevitably, its 
responsibilities would not be confined to medical judgment, but would need to extend to the 
other considerations inherent in the Section 4 framework.51 Finally, it should be noted that a 
bipartisan hybrid panel, with some medical expert and some non-medical members, is another 
possibility, as some current members of Congress have recently proposed.52 
                                               
the Supreme Court’s involvement in determining presidential inability would violate separation of powers. 
Presidential Inability: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
85th Cong. 14 (1958) [hereinafter 1958 Senate Subcomm. Hearings] (letter from Chief Justice Warren) (“It has been 
the belief of all of us that because of the separation of powers in our Government, the nature of the judicial process, 
the possibility of a controversy of this character coming to the Court, and the danger of disqualification which might 
result in lack of a quorum, it would be inadvisable for any member of the Court to serve on such a Commission.”). 
47 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
48 See, e.g., Robert E. Gilbert, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the Establishment of Medical Impairment Panels: Are 
the Two Safely Compatible?, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1111, 1118 (2017) (arguing that an other body composed of medical 
experts would “undermine [the President’s] overall professional reputation and make it much more difficult for him 
to lead or, in other words, to exert influence.”); id. at 1125 (arguing that an ‘other body’ composed of medical experts 
could provide Congress “at least two competing, divergent, and eminently ‘respectable’ psychiatric opinions upon 
which to hang their votes,” permitting congressmen “to” subscribe rather easily to whatever opinion supported their 
normal partisan proclivities, while insisting that their votes were based on the proffered medical advice and nothing 
else.”). 
49 Bayh, supra note 27, at 447-8 (“Unlike the members of a panel, the White House physician, the Vice President, and 
the members of the Cabinet, those who work with and observe the President day in and day out, are in the best 
position to notice character traits and changes which impact on the President's ability to perform the powers and 
duties of his office.”) 
50 Id. at 447-48. 
51 Id. at 446-47 (“Under the terms of the amendment, Congress could designate a panel. However, the panel would 
replace the Cabinet and its role would not be confined to medical judgment.”). 
52 In May 2017, Congressman Jamin Raskin (MD-08) and twenty co-sponsors introduced H.R. 1987 to establish a 
permanent independent nonpartisan “other body” authorized to declare that the President is “unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office.” Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity Act, H.R. 1987, 115th Cong. 
(2017). Congressional leadership of each party would choose several medical professionals and at least one elder 
statesperson who has served in a senior role in the executive branch or as Surgeon General. The Commission’s 
members would then choose an eleventh member to act as chair. Id. We take no opinion on the specific composition 
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C. When should Congress create an “other body”?
In a situation where the President will contest whether he is unable to fulfill his duties, 
activating Section 4 of the Amendment through the Principal Officers will be exceedingly 
difficult unless the Vice President already knows that a majority of the Principal Officers 
supports invoking the Amendment—and who those officers are.53 In theory, any single Principal 
Officer or other White House insider who disagrees that the President is rendered unable could 
short-circuit the process by informing the President, potentially triggering a cascade of firings 
of those Principal Officers who favor Section 4’s invocation. 54  Presidents generally choose 
Cabinet members at least in part on the basis of perceived loyalty.55 This could potentially 
preclude meaningful informed deliberation by Principal Officers regarding initiating the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment process.  
Some commentators accept this as a feature of the system: having received the democratic 
mantle of election by the voters, the President should receive every advantage in a contested 
invocation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.56 But the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
required only that a simple majority of the Principal Officers or other body agree that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency. The primary intent of 
the Amendment was to ensure continuity of leadership and avoid dysfunction. The framers did 
not intend to require that any one person—perhaps not even a Principal Officer—be able to 
short-circuit the process. 
The framers of the Amendment created the “other body” option to account for this possibility. 
The President would not have the ability to dismiss the members of the other body at will, unlike 
the Principal Officers. As a result, the other body would be better able to conduct informed 
deliberations regarding a potential inability that will be contested by the President. The other 
body could still seek advice and evidence from the Principal Officers. The President would still 
be protected by the necessity of the Vice President’s participation and the two-thirds majority 
required in both Houses of Congress.  
of the Commission proposed in H.R. 1987, noting only that a hybrid medical/nonmedical body might allay some of the 
framers’ concerns about the problems regarding purely medical panels. 
53  Indeed, commentators contend that even “had the Twenty-fifth Amendment existed during the illnesses of 
Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, the informal power of the President’s private staff or spouse was such 
that the requirements of the amendment could have been avoided.” Katy J. Harriger, Who Should Decide? 
Constitutional and Political Issues Regarding Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 563, 
567 (1995) (citing PARK, supra note 7, at 200). 
54 See infra Section VII.G. 
55 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 3262 (1965) (statement of Sen. Fong) (“It is reasonable to assume that persons the President 
selects as Cabinet officers are the President's most devoted and loyal supporters who would naturally wish his 
continuance as president.”). 
56 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“The [Amendment] shall . . . be in favor of the 
President because he is the elected representative of the people, the first officer of the land, and he shall be favored 
without doubt.”). 
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For the reasons discussed in Part I.B of this Reader’s 
Guide, there are strong arguments why this other body 
should be bipartisan and composed primarily of 
“statespersons” with government experience, rather 
than medical experts. But to provide for necessary 
medical expertise, if Congress chooses to enact 
legislation to create an “other body,” it might also choose 
to create a standing Twenty-Fifth Amendment medical 
and political advisory board. In a time of emergency, it 
would be preferable for the Vice President and either the 
Principal Officers or the “other body” to have such a 
standing advisory board, to avoid needing to scramble to 
find trusted expert advice, particularly on the medical 
questions regarding whether the President is unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of the office. 
II. The Determination of Presidential Inability Under Section 4 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The critical determination to be made in the various transmissions envisioned by Section 4 is 
one of presidential inability: whether “the President is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of his office.” This section reviews the general theory of presidential inability and the 
specific historical precedents. 
A. What constitutes presidential inability?
In general, authorities on the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment agree that the term “inability” has no 
specific definition. The original drafters and 
subsequent commentators provided some examples 
of what the term encompasses and what would fall 
outside its ambit, but did not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive definition of the term itself. To be 
sure, foremost in their minds at the time of drafting was a physical or mental impairment that 
would prevent the President from performing his constitutional duties. But the text of Section 
4 sets forth a flexible standard intentionally designed to apply to a wide variety of unforeseen 
emergencies. As a result, those deciding whether a President is “unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office” should focus on the overall effects of the inability—whether the totality 
of the circumstances suggests that inability prevents him from discharging the powers and 
duties of the presidency—rather than the specific characteristics of the inability itself. Absent 
some inability, however, Section 4 is not a vehicle for separating the President from his powers 
and duties based solely on political disagreement, however intense it might be.  
1. Text and legislative history
Prior to the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Constitution provided for 
presidential succession in Article II, Section I, Clause 6. This clause referenced “Inability to 
discharge the Powers and Duties of [the presidency]” as one of the cases in which the Vice 
President should assume those powers and duties. The records of the Constitutional 
For the reasons discussed 
in Part I.B of this Reader’s 
Guide, there are strong 
arguments why this other 
body should be bipartisan 
and composed primarily  
of “statespersons” with 
government experience, 
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In general, authorities on the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
agree that the term “inability” 
has no specific definition. 
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Convention contain only one reference to “inability” as mentioned in this clause: John Dickinson 
of Delaware asked on August 27, 1787, “What is the extent of the term ‘disability’ and who is to 
be the judge of it?”57 That crucial question was not answered in any other part of the records of 
the Constitutional Convention.58 The rest of the debates say little about either the substantive 
meaning of the term “inability,” or the procedural question of who should determine its 
existence and termination.59  
The consensus view is that that the determination of a President’s inability under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment is ultimately a matter of political judgment based on accurate and adequate 
medical or other evidentiary input.60 Indeed, while they listed a number of potential examples 
of presidential inability, the framers of the Amendment scrupulously avoided placing specific 
limits on the term. In the Senate debates of February 19, 1965, Senator Bayh stated that “the 
word ‘inability’ and the word ‘unable’ as used in [Section 4] . . . , which refer to an impairment of 
the President’s faculties, mean that he is unable either to make or communicate his decisions as 
to his own competency to execute the powers and duties of his office.”61 A colloquy between 
Senator Bayh and Senator Robert F. Kennedy in the Senate debates of June 30, 1965 further 
illuminates Senator Bayh’s opinion of the meaning of “inability.” In response to a question from 
Senator Kennedy, he clarified his belief that “inability” should not be limited to mental inability, 
but rather must extend to any “inability to perform the constitutional duties of the office of 
President.”62  
In 1988, Mortimer Caplin, vice-chairman of the Miller Center Commission on Presidential 
Disability, stated that “inability” encompasses physical conditions, mental illnesses, chronic 
diseases, and unforeseen emergencies—including political emergencies 63 —that render the   
President unable to act. Several other accounts reference a presidential kidnapping as 
constituting presidential inability.64 Various statements in the debates and hearings of 1964 
57 S. REP. NO. 88-1382 at 3 (1964). 
58 Id. 
59 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 3.  
60 Memorandum from Daniel J. Meador to Professors Kenneth Crispell, Kenneth Thompson, and Paul Stephan (Nov. 
5, 1985), in 4 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT BY SIX MEDICAL, LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL AUTHORITIES 71, 74, (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1997); Kenneth R. Crispell, The Physician to the President, 
in 4 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT BY SIX MEDICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL 
AUTHORITIES 93, 100 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1997). 
61 111 CONG. REC. 3282 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
62 Id. at 15,381. 
63 Mortimer Caplin, Revisiting the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, in 2 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-
FIFTH AMENDMENT BY SIX MEDICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL AUTHORITIES 9, 14 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1991). 
Depending on the circumstances, this could perhaps include a political emergency: commentators have suggested 
that impeachment proceedings might give rise to a President choosing to step away from office under Section 3. See 
FEERICK, supra note 9, at 198; Joel K. Goldstein, Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring 
Presidential Continuity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 959, 979 n.109 (2010). In fact, before he resigned, President Nixon 
considered temporarily stepping away from the Presidency under Section 3 while he fought impeachment. See BOB 
WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF WATERGATE 126 (2012). Conceivably, a political emergency 
could also affect the President in a manner that would justify an exercise of Section 4. In the days leading up to 
Nixon’s resignation, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, deeply concerned about the President’s stability, 
instructed the military not to follow Nixon’s orders—especially those related to nuclear weapons—unless confirmed 
by either Schlesinger or Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. See Robert D. McFadden, James R. Schlesinger, Willful 
Aide to Three Presidents, Is Dead at 85, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/28/us/politics/james-r-schlesinger-cold-war-hard-liner-dies-at-85.html. As 
with any other Section 4 inquiry, the touchstone would not be the particular inciting circumstance, but rather 
whether the President was unable to discharge the powers and duties of the office.  
64 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 9, at 115. 
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and 1965 declare that “inability” under the Amendment 
was not generally intended to include such conditions 
as unpopularity, incompetence, impeachable conduct, 
poor judgment, or laziness. 65  However, to the extent 
that any of these phenomena (or a combination of 
them) rose to a level where they prevented the 
President from carrying out his or her constitutional 
duties, they still might constitute an inability, even in the 
absence of a formal medical diagnosis. Representative 
Richard Poff of Virginia, another key framer of the 
Amendment, defined inability as the inability to make a 
rational decision. 66  A President who cannot 
demonstrate the minimal competence to rationally 
perform the duties of the office might be deemed 
constitutionally unable, even if signs of that deficiency 
were clear at the time of the President’s election to the 
term in which he sits.67  
The legislative history illustrates that a determination of presidential inability would depend on 
the circumstances in which it arose. Specifically, depending on the circumstances, in certain 
cases even a very short-lived disability might constitute “inability” under Section 4:  
A President who was unconscious for 30 minutes when missiles were flying 
toward this country might only be disabled temporarily, but it would be of severe 
consequence when viewed in the light of the problems facing the country. So at 
that time, even for that short duration, someone would have to make a decision. 
But a disability which has persisted for only a short time would ordinarily be 
excluded. If a President were unable to make an Executive decision which might 
have severe consequences for the country, I think we would be better under the 
conditions of the amendment [i.e. treating the President as unable to perform his 
duties].68 
Decision-makers considering implementation of the Amendment should recognize that the  
Amendment was motivated by the framers’ anxieties about the possibility of nuclear war 
resulting from presidential inability. Indeed, anxiety about the implications of the nuclear age 
animated every stage of the Amendment’s enactment, including the initial impetus for 
adopting the Amendment during President Kennedy’s term, and the congressional debates and 
65 111 CONG. REC. 3282-83 (statement of Sen. Hart); Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: 
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 25 (1964) 
[hereinafter 1964 Senate Subcomm. Hearings] (statement of Sen. Keating). 
66 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 117 (“[Section 4 provides for cases] when the President, by reason of mental debility[,] is 
unable or unwilling to make any rational decision, including particularly the decision to stand aside.”).  
67 Contrary to some recent writing, there is no support for the idea that the framers designed the Amendment only 
“to protect the government from random occurrences like sudden illness or a failed assassination attempt” or that a 
President “who already demonstrated [disabling] traits when the people . . . elected him to office” would somehow 
be immunized from the Amendment’s operation. See, e.g., Joshua Zeitz, Why the 25th Amendment Doesn’t Apply to 
Trump–No Matter What He Tweets, POLITICO MAG. (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2018/01/10/25th-amendment-trump-216267 (making those claims). 
68 111 CONG. REC. 15,381 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
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state ratifying conventions during President Johnson’s.69 The Cuban Missile Crisis was at the 
front of the framers’ minds.70 They knew that, without the Amendment, the world could be 
plunged into the “nightmare of nuclear holocaust or other national catastrophe” by “normal 
human frailties . . . at any time.”71  
While some view the absence of a definition for “inability” as a failing of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, others laud it as providing flexibility essential to the Amendment’s functionality. 
For instance, Representative Edward Hutchinson criticized the resolution that eventually 
became the Amendment on the grounds that the resolution’s failure to define “inability” or 
“disability” leaves the Vice President and the majority of the Principal Officers in Section 4 with 
“complete power to treat any condition or circumstance they choose as a disability.”72  
By contrast, Dean Feerick argues that it would be a mistake to attempt to define with specificity 
what constitutes inability.73 He believes that “[n]o set of definitions could possibly deal with 
every contingency” and detailed language could force unnecessary debate over whether or not 
the Amendment applies during a time of national crisis.74 In his view, defining inability in broad 
terms is an advantage in that it “allows for flexibility and discretion.” 75  Dean Feerick does, 
however, provide a few indicative examples of inability: situations in which the President is 
kidnapped or captured, or under an oxygen tent, or bereft of speech or sight at a time of enemy 
attack, could all constitute incidents of presidential inability falling under Section 4.76  
In refusing to define “inability,” the drafters of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment emphasized 
that the term’s meaning should be considered 
flexible and context-dependent; they firmly 
rejected formalism. Moreover, there is no 
indication that the examples of inability that 
they specifically imagined were meant to be 
exhaustive. The overwhelming consensus is 
that the drafters intended that the 
Amendment cover “any imaginable 
circumstance[]” in which the President “is 
unable to perform the powers and duties of 
that office.” 77  As a result, those deciding 
whether a President is “unable to discharge 
the powers and duties of his office” should 
focus on the overall effects of the inability—
whether the totality of the circumstances 
69  Rebecca C. Lubot, A Dr. Strangelove Situation: Nuclear Anxiety, Presidential Fallibility, and the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1175 (2017) (tracing nuclear anxiety’s importance throughout the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment’s historical, legislative, and ratifying record).  
70 Id. at 1179–80. 
71 Id. at 1188 (quoting President Johnson’s 1965 State of the Union at 111 CONG. REC. 1547 (1965)). 
72 H. REP.  NO. 89-203 at 20 (1965). 
73 John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: An Explanation and Defense, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 481, 502 (1995). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 115. 
77 Fordham University School of Law Second Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 29, at 928 (quoting KENNETH 
R. CRISPELL & CARLOS F. GOMEZ, HIDDEN ILLNESS IN THE WHITE HOUSE 209–10 (1988)).
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suggests that inability prevents him from discharging the powers and duties of the presidency—
rather than the specific characteristics of the inability itself. 
2. Executive Practice: Historical Examples by Presidencies78
As Justice Frankfurter famously noted in the Steel Seizure Case, a “gloss on ‘executive Power’ 
vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II” may stem from “a systematic, unbroken, executive 
practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, which 
over time, become “part of the structure of our government.”79 Likewise, it is well-established 
that legislatures make law in light of previous precedents of which they are aware.80 What 
follows is a discussion of historical examples of presidential inability that formed some of the 
historical background for the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
a. President Madison
In 1813, President James Madison suffered an illness that left him unable to conduct the 
responsibilities of the presidency for three weeks. President Madison was widely rumored to be 
seriously ill, and sixty-eight-year-old Vice President Elbridge Gerry became the focus of 
speculation regarding succession. This incident gave rise both to speculation that the President 
might not survive, and concern over Gerry’s ability to serve as President. Congress became 
obsessed with the question of succession. 
Madison ultimately recovered. On July 2, First Lady Dolley Madison wrote that the President’s 
fever had subsided and he was improving. On July 7, it was announced that the President had 
resumed the most urgent public business, meeting with a Senate committee a week later. 
Madison spent time in his Montpelier home in August where his health continued to improve, 
and when he returned to Washington in October of 1813, it became clear that his physical 
recovery was complete.  
b. President Tyler
On April 4, 1841, President William Henry Harrison, then the oldest President at the time of 
inauguration, died of pneumonia. When news reached Vice President John Tyler, he 
immediately headed to Washington, where he took the presidential oath of office.  
This was the first known dispute regarding the distinction between actually becoming 
President—assuming the office of the presidency—and “acting as President,” i.e., assuming the 
powers and duties of the President, without actually assuming the office. Tyler made clear his 
belief that by taking the oath, he had ascended to the Office of the President itself and was not 
merely an Acting President. However, some Whig Party leaders referred to Tyler as the “Acting 
President.” Congress debated the issue, ultimately passing resolutions that labeled Tyler as the 
“President.”  
c. President Garfield 
78 This section, and the examples included in it are largely excerpted, with thanks, from the work of Dean Feerick. See 
FEERICK, supra note 9, at 1-24, 190-204 and John D. Feerick, Presidential Succession and Inability: Before and After the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 907 (2011). 
79 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also N.L.R.B. v. 
Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (“[I]n a separation-of-powers case . . . the longstanding practice of the 
government can inform our determination of what the law is.” (internal citations omitted)). 
80 See, e.g., C. Lawrence Evans, Legislative Structure: Rules, Precedents, and Jurisdictions, 24 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 605 (1999).  
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On July 2, 1881, the nation was faced with its first prolonged case of presidential inability when 
President Garfield was shot by a disappointed office-seeker and wavered between life and 
death for the next eighty days.  
During this period of inability, the President’s visitors were restricted to family and physicians, 
with only occasional visits from members of his Cabinet. Garfield’s doctors determined that he 
needed rest to have any chance at recovery and prevented him from discharging his powers 
and duties. His only official act during this time was the signing of an extradition paper on 
August 10. Though the Cabinet tried to keep the wheels of government turning, there was 
much the members could not do, particularly in the arena of foreign affairs.  
In late August, Secretary of State James Blaine prepared a paper on presidential inability, 
arguing that since the Constitution at the time contained no directions for replacing a disabled 
President, Vice President Chester A. Arthur should be called to Washington to assume the 
presidency. Only a few members of the Cabinet agreed, with a majority arguing that under the 
“Tyler Precedent,” Vice President Arthur would succeed the presidency for the entire remainder 
of the term. Arthur, however, fearful of being labeled a usurper, made it clear that he would not 
assume presidential responsibility.  
Following President Garfield’s death on September 19, 1881, the debate over the meaning of the 
Succession Clause continued in the press, legal journals, and Congress. When Vice President 
Arthur finally succeeded to the presidency, there was no Vice President, no president pro 
tempore of the Senate, and no speaker of the House of Representatives—in short, no 
constitutional successor to the Presidency after Arthur. Newly-elevated President Arthur 
recognized this problem, and in several messages to Congress, he expressed concern over the 
ambiguities of the existing succession provisions. The Garfield-Arthur episode became one of 
several historical touchstones that animated the eventual adoption of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. 
d. President Wilson
On October 2, 1919, President Wilson suffered a stroke that paralyzed the left side of his body. 
The President’s close friend and physician, Dr. Cary Grayson, released a bulletin stating, “The 
President is a very sick man.” From that time until the inauguration of President Warren G. 
Harding on March 4, 1921, the country lacked an able President. In the days and weeks following 
President Wilson’s stroke, there were repeated demands for Vice President Thomas Marshall 
to act as President. However, because of confusion surrounding the succession provision, 
resistance from President Wilson and his inner circle, and Vice President Marshall’s reluctance 
to appear a usurper, these demands never were fulfilled.81  
81 See Joel K. Goldstein, Vice-Presidential Behavior in a Disability Crisis: The Case of Thomas R. Marshall, 33 POL. & LIFE 
SCI. 37 (2014) (noting the many practical constraints that prevented Vice President Marshall from taking a more 
active role during Wilson’s illness). 
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e. President Eisenhower 
On September 24, 1955, President Eisenhower suffered a heart attack while vacationing in 
Colorado. That evening, Vice President Richard M. Nixon met with members of the Cabinet to 
discuss arrangements for operation of the executive branch during President Eisenhower’s 
recovery in Denver. It was decided that the Cabinet and White House should continue the 
administration of the government. The Cabinet agreed on the following procedure: First, on 
actions that Cabinet members would normally take without consulting either the Cabinet or 
the President, there would be no change from the normal. Second, questions that would 
normally be brought before the Cabinet for discussion before any decision would continue to 
be discussed there. Third, decisions requiring consultation with the President should first go to 
the Cabinet or the National Security Council for thorough discussion and possible 
recommendation before going to President Eisenhower in Denver for his consideration. This 
procedure continued until the President fully recovered. 
On June 8, 1956, the President suffered an attack of ileitis (inflammation of the ileum, part of the 
small intestine) and was taken to Walter Reed Hospital. The following day, he underwent a two-
hour operation for the removal of an obstruction of the small intestine, during which he was 
unconscious. The President was up and walking by June 10 and deemed “fully recovered” by 
August 27.  
On November 25, 1957, President Eisenhower suffered a stroke affecting his ability to speak. 
The next day, members of his staff met to discuss President Eisenhower’s condition. However, 
medical bulletins indicated that his health had improved, and by December 2, the President 
returned to work in the White House.  
Understandably, all of these episodes made President Eisenhower very concerned about the 
question of presidential inability. He drafted a “letter agreement” with Vice President Richard 
Nixon outlining steps to take should future events render Eisenhower incapacitated. This was 
the first substantive step towards addressing the issue of inability and succession that 
ultimately led to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
f. President Kennedy
On November 22, 1963, the nation experienced one of its most shocking tragedies when 
President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas. Efforts made to save the President, 
though unsuccessful in this case because of the gross severity of his wounds, underscored 
again the absence of constitutional procedures to account for the case in which a President 
might linger unconscious, either for days or for a more extended period of time. Succession 
beyond the Vice Presidency also came into focus as rumors circulated that Vice President 
Johnson had suffered a heart attack shortly after President Kennedy had been shot. Fortunately, 
there was no truth to these rumors, and the nation did not have to test the adequacy of 
succession mechanisms beyond the Vice Presidency. The Kennedy Assassination was the most 
immediate impetus for the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967. 
g. President Reagan
i. Assassination Attempt
On March 30, 1981, John W. Hinckley, Jr. shot President Ronald Reagan as he exited the 
Washington Hilton Hotel after delivering a speech. Vice President George H.W. Bush was en 
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route from Fort Worth to Austin, Texas, for a speech. Upon hearing the news, Vice President 
Bush traveled immediately to Washington, D.C. There, members of the Cabinet and staff 
gathered in the White House Situation Room. President Reagan’s Secretary of State, Alexander 
M. Haig, Jr., noted in his memoirs that the officials handling the crisis were “an ad hoc group; no 
plan existed, we possessed no list of guidelines, no chart that established rank or function. Our 
work was a matter of calling on experience and exercising judgment.”82  
 
Significantly, although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment procedures were available, the Reagan 
administration did not invoke the Amendment during the crisis surrounding the attempted 
assassination of the President. Accounts vary, but “it seems clear that the issue was resolved 
by a handful of officials without the kind of formal action by the Cabinet and Vice President that 
the Amendment contemplated” under Section 4.83 Still, Fred Fielding, the White House Counsel 
at the time, recalled drafting letters to Congress invoking Section 3 and Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. According to an account by Del Quentin Wilber in Rawhide Down, 
Fielding had even prepared a binder around the 1981 inauguration outlining the procedures to 
follow should the President be killed or incapacitated. 84  Additionally, shortly after the 
assassination attempt, the Office of Legal Counsel, led by Assistant Attorney General Theodore 
B. Olson, prepared a memo outlining both the operation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment and 
the President’s ability to delegate authority to subordinates without invoking the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. 85  But President Reagan recovered relatively quickly, and the question of 
succession was not considered at length.  
Although Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was not invoked after the Reagan 
assassination attempt it clearly should have been. President Reagan suffered from significant 
loss of blood and a collapsed lung, and subsequently developed pneumonia.86 His staff decided 
not to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment for several reasons: they were unfamiliar with its 
provisions, they did not want to “alarm” the public, and Vice President George H.W. Bush was 
wary of appearing to seize power.87  
 
During and following Reagan’s incapacitation, it remained ambiguous who maintained 
authority to make executive decisions. But legally, there was no uncertainty: “Reagan 
maintained formal presidential power throughout the entire period. The thinking of the 
president’s men on temporary replacement was emphatically and repeatedly stated.”88 When 
his staff was asked about Vice President Bush’s technical status, they stressed that Bush 
remained the Vice President, not “the stand-in president,” and that President Reagan “will make 
                                               
82 ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY 153 (1984). 
83 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 195. 
84 See DEL QUENTIN WILBER, RAWHIDE DOWN, 166-67 (2011). 
85 See Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney Gen. from Theodore B. Olson, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, Re: Presidential Succession and Delegation in Case of Disability (April 3, 1981). In 1985, O.L.C. authored an 
even more detailed memo on the operation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See Memorandum Opinion for the 
Attorney Gen. from Ralph W. Tarr, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Operation of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment Respecting Presidential Succession (June 14, 1985). For a discussion of that memo’s 
conclusions, which correspond with this Reader’s Guide, see note 140. Although outside of the scope of this Reader’s 
Guide, the President’s ability to delegate authority remains an avenue for a wounded President to remain 
constitutionally in control while also removing some day-to-day responsibilities from his or her direct supervision. 
Those interested in a detailed account on delegation should consult Mr. Olson’s 1981 OLC memo. 
86 ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 138-44. 
87 Id. at 182-9. 
88 Id. at 185. 
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all of the decisions, as he always has.” It would be “just as if the president were here in the Oval 
Office,” said White House Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver.89  
 
Vice President Bush affirmed this message, stating to the press that “[t]he power of decision 
has remained with President Reagan.”90 But Bush was somewhat unclear in articulating exactly 
what his role would be as Reagan recuperated, perhaps reflecting the lack of clarity within the 
administration. He reportedly said that “[Reagan] is not incapacitated and I am not going to be 
a substitute President. I’m here to sit in for him while he recuperates. But he’s going to call the 
shots.” 91  Bush was firm that he never planned to pursue major policy initiatives or make 
decisions independently. He said, “I didn’t have any major solitary decisions to make . . . . I made 
decisions on what I’m going to do with my time, on how to project my role, not decisions in 
terms of should we make a new move on this type of bill or should we send this signal up on the 
spending cuts.”92 However, Bush also noted that the restrictions on his decision-making arose 
partly because he was still officially Vice President, which was “different from making 
Presidential decisions or surrogate Presidential decisions.”93 The plain implication is that if Bush 
had formally become Acting President, he would have been empowered to make “Presidential 
decisions.” But he refrained from doing so, given the temporary nature of Reagan’s 
immobilization and the decision not to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
 
Significantly, while the Administration was adamant in its public messaging that President 
Reagan always remained in charge, the history of what unfolded suggests otherwise. The 
historical record shows that during that time, Vice President Bush and a few key White House 
advisors shared de facto executive decision-making power. When Reagan first went into 
surgery hours after the shooting, Vice President Bush was flying back from Texas with bad 
communications; Secretary of State Alexander Haig incorrectly asserted that he was in charge, 
telling reporters that “[a]s of now, I am in control here.”94 The staff of the White House quickly 
contradicted Haig, and agreed that Bush would be responsible for any critical decision-making 
in the case of a crisis; some believed that Bush was “clearly acting for the president.”95 White 
House spokesman Larry Speakes said at a news conference that Bush had “automatically 
inherited ‘national command authorities,’” and in the following days had led cabinet meetings 
and met with congressional leadership and heads of state.96 However, though Bush’s activities 
                                               
89 Id. 
90  Hedrick Smith, Bush Says He Sought To Avoid Acting Like Surrogate President, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/12/us/bush-says-he-sought-to-avoid-acting-like-surrogate-president.html. 
91  Hedrick Smith, Starting as an Outsider, Bush Is Now a Star Among Team Players, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1981), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/04/05/weekinreview/starting-as-an-outsider-bush-is-now-a-star-among-team-
players.html. 
92 Smith, supra note 90. 
93 Id. 
94 In the White House Press Room, Haig told reporters: “Constitutionally, gentlemen, you have the president, the vice 
president and the secretary of state, in that order, and should the president decide he wants to transfer the helm to 
the vice president, he will do so . . . . As of now, I am in control here, in the White House.” He apparently had forgotten 
that the House speaker and the Senate’s president pro tempore come before the secretary of state in the line of 
succession. Richard V. Allen, When Reagan Was Shot, Who Was ‘In Control’ at the White House?, WASH. POST (Mar. 
25, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/when-reagan-was-shot-who-was-in-control-at-the-white-
house/2011/03/23/AFJlrfYB_story.html. 
95 Walter S. Mossberg, Confusion Over Who Was in Charge Arose Following Reagan Shooting, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1981, 
at 31; ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 186. 
96 ABRAMS, supra note 29, at 186-87. As noted elsewhere in this Reader’s Guide, this outcome—a group of unelected 
officials taking over the powers and duties of the President, rather than the Amendment being exercised—was 
exactly the one the Amendment was intended to avoid.  
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might have appeared presidential in nature, “there is no evidence that he was any more closely 
involved in the decision-making process.”97 
 
In practice, it was White House Chief of Staff James Baker, Counselor to the President Edwin 
Meese, and White House Deputy Chief of Staff Michael Deaver who ran the show during this 
critical time. Professor Herbert Abrams described the allocation of duties during the recovery 
period: 
 
In the absence of an acting president, their daily meetings covered the range of 
foreign and domestic policy decisions. Meese was considered the "heavyweight" 
through his work with the cabinet, the National Security Council, and the 
domestic policy group. In the formulation of policy, he seemed to articulate the 
president's view as well as anyone. Baker played a critical role as the supervisor 
of other White House operations and the channel by which virtually all 
documentation reached the president (although there was little enough of that) 
. . . During the period of trauma and convalescence, they were the president of the 
United States.98  
 
For the next few weeks, President Reagan continued to be unable to work for more than a few 
hours per week. The unresolved issues for presidential decision began to pile up. The “sheer 
volume of president-only decisions” could not be handled by Baker, Meese, and Deaver alone.99 
The difficulty of attempting to conduct business-as-usual with a severely handicapped head of 
state led a number of those aides to admit retrospectively that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
should have been invoked, as least for the period in which Reagan was in critical condition and 
undergoing surgery.100 The President’s physician, Dr. Daniel Ruge, also agreed that the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment should have been triggered.101 
 
The immense power wielded by presidential aides Baker, Meese, and Deaver during this episode 
suggests that even if Vice President Bush had formally become Acting President through an 
invocation of Section 4, he would have been significantly constrained in his decision-making by 
Reagan’s own staff. Bush was also limited by his own stated concern about exercising an 
abundance of caution not to appear to be grabbing power opportunistically. Bush “took pains 
to keep his conduct loyal, dutiful, and unassuming” throughout the period.102 Bush’s caution may 
have been influenced by his awareness that Reagan was expected to recover and resume his 
duties as President. The assassination attempt occurred early in Reagan’s term, while White 
House lines of control were still new. If Reagan’s condition had worsened over time, Bush may 
have begun to act more authoritatively as de facto Acting President. The temporariness of the 
inability in this episode makes it difficult to extrapolate to a situation in which the President’s 
inability is longer-lived, or impacts more time-sensitive decisions that can be made only by the 
President. 
  
                                               
97 Id. at 187. 
98 Id. at 188. 
99 Id. at 191. 
100 Looking back on the event, Meese said he believes that “the president should relieve himself of authority under 
Section 3 before going into surgery, or should be relieved of authority under Section 4 if unconscious. But he 
maintained that Reagan was not disabled during the recovery period, and that it would have been improper to have 
Bush act as president during that time.” Id. at 195. 
101 Id. at 192. 
102 Id. at 187. 
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ii.  Cancer Surgery 
 
On July 12, 1985, President Reagan entered Bethesda Naval Hospital for a surgical procedure to 
remove a polyp from his colon. While avoiding specific invocation of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, Reagan basically followed the procedure outlined in Section 3. Dean Feerick has 
speculated that at the time, Reagan chose this course because he did not want to appear weak 
or set a harmful precedent for the presidency. Before undergoing anesthesia, Reagan signed a 
document addressed to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate transferring power to Vice President Bush as Acting President, while 
again disclaiming any formal use of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. He cited a “longstanding 
arrangement” with Bush and intent not to set a “binding precedent.”  
 
The letter, reproduced in full in the Appendix, states: 
 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney General, I am mindful of 
the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 
and of the uncertainties of its application to such brief and temporary periods of 
incapacity. I do not believe that the drafters of this Amendment intended its 
application to situations such as the instant one. 
 
Nevertheless, consistent with my longstanding arrangement with Vice 
President George Bush, and not intending to set a precedent binding anyone 
privileged to hold this Office in the future, I have determined and it is my 
intention and direction that Vice President George Bush shall discharge those 
powers and duties in my stead commencing with the administration of 
anesthesia to me in this instance. 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I am able to 
resume the discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office. 
(emphasis added). 
 
Five hours after surgery, Reagan signed a letter to congressional leaders informing them that 
he was resuming his powers and duties. His later accounts, along with those of First Lady Nancy 
Reagan, did mention invoking the amendment.103 
 
iii.   Alleged Incapacity in 1987 
 
When Senator Howard Baker became Chief of Staff in 1987, his transition team was allegedly 
told by the staff of the outgoing Chief of Staff Donald Regan that President Reagan had become 
“inattentive, inept,” and “lazy,” and that as Chief of Staff, Baker should be prepared to invoke the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment if necessary, to relieve him of his duties. Reagan’s biographer 
Edmund Morris stated in an interview aired on PBS that The incoming Baker people all decided 
to have a meeting with him on Monday, their first official meeting with the President, and to 
cluster around the table in the Cabinet room and watch him very, very closely to see how he 
behaved, to see if he was indeed losing his mental grip. . . . Reagan who was, of course, completely 
unaware that they were launching a death watch on him, came in stimulated by the press of all 
                                               
103 Feerick, supra note 78, at 930. 
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these new people and performed splendidly. At the end of the meeting, they figuratively threw 
up their hands realizing he was in perfect command of himself.104 
 
h. President George W. Bush 
On both June 29, 2002, and July 21, 2007, President George W. Bush invoked Section 3 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment when undergoing medical procedures requiring sedation, thereby 
temporarily transferring his powers and duties to Vice President Dick Cheney as the Acting 
President. In contrast to President Reagan’s letters, President Bush’s letters to congressional 
leaders specifically cited Section 3 of the Amendment, marking the first times this section was 
invoked explicitly. The letter, reproduced in full in the Appendix, states in relevant part: 
 
This morning I will undergo a routine medical procedure requiring sedation. In view of present 
circumstances, I have determined to transfer temporarily my Constitutional powers and duties 
to the Vice President during the brief period of the procedure and recovery. 
 
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, this letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am unable to 
discharge the Constitutional powers and duties of the office of the President of the United 
States. Pursuant to Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those powers and duties as 
Acting President until I transmit to you a written declaration that I am able to resume the 
discharge of those powers and duties. (emphasis added). 
 
B. How to Assess Presidential Inability 
 
These varied historical scenarios suggest a range of possible presidential inabilities that might 
lead to triggering of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. On its face, the Amendment imposes no 
requirement as to the type or quantity of evidence required for either “Transmission 1”—the 
initial determination of presidential inability by the Vice President and the Principal Officers (or 
such other body as Congress may by law provide) or for the “Second Declaration of Inability”—
Congress’s subsequent determination of presidential inability in the event of disagreement 
between the President, on the one hand, and the Vice President and the Principal Officers on 
the other, as to the President’s fitness to resume the powers and duties of his office.  
 
1. What evidence should be relied upon in determining inability? 
The decision to locate in the Executive Branch the initial power to declare the President unable 
reflects not only the calculation that doing so would best comply with separation of powers 
principles, but also that the Vice President and the Principal Officers (acting as part of the 
Cabinet) are the most likely actors to have the information required to make the determination. 
During the Senate Hearings in 1965, Senator Roman Hruska articulated this reasoning:  
 
  
                                               
104  American Experience: Reagan, (PBS television broadcast Feb. 23, 1998), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/films/reagan/; see also JANE MAYER & DOYLE MCMANUS, LANDSLIDE: 
THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1984-1988, at x (1988) (describing James Cannon’s suggestion to Chief of Staff 
Howard Baker on March 1, 1987 “Consider the possibility that section four of the 25th amendment might be applied”); 
J. JACKSON OWENSBY, THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (REVISITED) 116–17 (2011); Jane Mayer, Worrying about Reagan, 
NEW YORKER (Feb. 24, 2011), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/worrying-about-reagan.  
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The determination of presidential inability and its termination is obviously a 
factual matter. No policy is involved. The issue is simply whether a specific 
individual with certain physical, mental, or emotional impairments possesses the 
ability to continue as the Chief Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious 
and severe as to render him incapable of executing the duties of his office. . . . 
Obviously, such a decision must rest on the relevant and reliable facts regarding 
the President’s physical or mental faculties. It must be divorced from any 
thoughts of political advantage, personal prejudice, or other extraneous factors. 
Those possessing such firsthand information about the Chief Executive, or most 
accessible to it on a personal basis, are found within the executive branch and 
not elsewhere.105 
 
Testimony by former Attorney General Brownell notes that the Bill did not provide for a 
specially constituted fact-finding body (other than the Principal Officers) to determine 
presidential inability. But it recognized the risk of the Principal Officers “coming out with a split 
decision” and thus putting either the President or the Vice President in an “awkward, completely 
untenable and impotent position.” 106  It was in part for that reason that the Amendment 
provides the alternative option: for Congress to create “by law” another body to make this 
determination, with the Vice President, “if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent 
experience.”107 
 
Should the President contest the Vice President and Principal Officers’ determination of 
inability and should those officials then make a “Second Declaration of Inability,” the ultimate 
determination regarding presidential inability shifts to Congress. The hearings and debates on 
the Amendment reflect the intent to give Congress wide latitude to determine what evidence 
it should consider in making that ultimate determination. The Committee report notes that the 
timeline for Congress to decide whether the President is fit to resume his powers and duties in 
the face of opposition from the Vice President and the Principal Officers was designed to ensure 
that Congress “act[s] swiftly in making this determination, but with sufficient opportunity to 
gather whatever evidence it determined necessary to make such a final determination.”108 The 
obvious implication is that the Amendment’s drafters did not intend to dictate what evidence 
would be required to make such a determination; instead, they expected Congress to decide 
what evidence it needs when such an occasion arises. The testimony of Senator Roman Hruska 
confirms this reading: “The language . . . leaves to Congress the determination of what, in light 
of the circumstances then existing, must be examined in deciding the issue. Thus, the matter 
will be examined on the evidence available.”109 
 
Some had concerns regarding the Amendment’s language’s refusal to specify precisely what 
evidence the Vice President and the Principal Officers (or such other body as Congress may by 
law provide), or Congress must consider in making the determination of presidential inability. 
The committee reports specifically stated an expectation that medical input would inform 
Congress’ judgment.110 Representative Edward Hutchinson worried that this lack of specificity 
                                               
105 1965 Senate Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 33-34 (statement of Sen. Hruska) (emphasis added). 
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110 See, e.g., id. at 13. 
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could allow the Amendment to become a purely political tool for ousting a President. 111 
Hutchinson warned that because the resolution “offers no hint that the determination of 
inability shall be based on medical or psychiatric evidence . . . instead, the determination will be 
a political one; and here lies a danger in the proposal.”112 In spite of these objections, no language 
was added to the resolution to clarify the nature of the evidence required. The rejection of 
Hutchinson’s concerns suggests that the Amendment’s intent is to prioritize flexibility in 
implementation of both the initial and final inability determinations. 
The congressional debates over the Amendment also reveal minimal discussion regarding what 
measures the Vice President and Principal Officers or Congress can use to obtain evidence, or 
what the President could do to avoid disclosure of such evidence. Before the first transmission 
is made, it seems unlikely that the Vice President or the Principal Officers would be able to 
compel the President to disclose evidence for the same reason they would be unlikely to alert 
him to the fact that they are considering invoking Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: 
the President has the power to fire members of his Cabinet. After the first transmission—at 
which point the Vice President would have assumed the powers and duties of office as Acting 
President—it appears that the debates surrounding the Amendment focused on Congress’s 
power to assemble evidence. 113  This suggests that the Amendment’s drafters did not 
contemplate that the Vice President and Principal Officers or other body would continue to 
investigate, once they have made their initial determination of inability. 
Congress’s power to compel evidence from the President in a later stage of this process—in its 
role as ultimate adjudicator of presidential inability—is discussed below, in Part V.E of this 
Reader’s Guide.  
2. What role should medical expertise play in the determination? 
 During the hearings and debates surrounding the adoption of 
the Amendment, the drafters generally seemed to 
contemplate some sort of medical evaluation being involved 
in both the executive branch and Congressional 
determinations of inability. Virtually every proposal submitted 
for congressional consideration expected that the body 
determining presidential inability would seek and obtain 
independent medical advice. 114  However, there is no 
consensus as to what sort of medical information would 
suffice, or how that information would best be gathered. 
Indeed, there is no requirement that a determination of 
inability be based on a medical diagnosis, or even medical 
evidence, at all. However, there is a general consensus that 
while medical evidence may inform the inability 
determination, the determination of inability is not a medical 
decision, and non-office-holding medical professionals should 
not be the sole ultimate decisionmakers as to whether or not 
the President is disabled under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
111 H. REP. NO. 89-203 at 19 (1965). 
112 Id. 
113 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 89-66 at 3 (1965); 1965 Senate Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 35. 
114 Feerick, supra note 73, at 499. 
The determination of 
inability is not a 
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non-office-holding 
medical professionals 
should not be the sole 
ultimate decisionmakers  
as to whether or not the 
President is disabled 
under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment. 
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In referencing a scenario “where the president’s ability to perform is being contested,” Senator 
Bayh suggested that Congress, “sitting in judgment,” would hear from medical experts and 
constitutional authorities while “examin[ing] the particular kind of illness in the abstract and . . 
. talk[ing] to the specific physicians that are dealing with the specific case.”115 In the event of this 
kind of dispute, Senator Bayh imagined a public debate in Congress during which “the cabinet 
and the vice president would all want to have as many medical witnesses as possible to show 
why their actions were well founded,” while “[t]he President . . . would want to try to get people 
to support his contentions.”116 Attorney General-designate Nicholas deB. Katzenbach testified 
that the timeline must be such that Congress is able to engage in reasonable debate and to 
inquire of physicians (including psychiatrists) as well as members of the President’s family and 
of the Cabinet.117 
 
However, there is broad consensus that the drafters did not intend that independent medical 
professionals be the sole ultimate decisionmakers regarding whether the President was 
disabled. Dean Feerick comments that “[t]he drafters of the amendment were acutely aware of 
the idea of an independent medical panel determining presidential inability [but] they rejected 
the idea in favor of an advisory role for doctors.”118 Feerick himself testified before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments in 1964 that he opposed the creation of a 
commission of unelected and un-appointed medical professionals because “[i]nability is more 
than a medical question.”119  
 
The idea of an independent panel of doctors charged with deciding whether a President is 
unable was extensively considered and discussed during the hearings that led to the adoption 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.120 For example, Attorney General William P. Rogers testified 
before the Senate Subcommittee that he opposed this idea because it would “give a hostile 
commission power to harass the President constantly,” which would “be an affront to the 
President’s personal dignity” and “degrade the presidential office itself.”121 He also expressed 
the opinion that it would be “ill advised to establish complicated procedures which would 
prevent immediate action in case of an emergency” because doing so would undermine “the 
need for continuity in the exercise of Executive power and leadership” in times of crisis.122 This 
line of argument suggests that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is intentionally vague on what 
evidence will suffice for a determination of presidential inability so as to preserve the 
procedure’s flexibility in emergency situations. 
 
The Committee Report accompanying the Senate bill that eventually became the Amendment 
stated that “[i]t is assumed that [the initial determination, i.e. Transmission 1] be made only 
after adequate consultation with medical experts who were intricately familiar with the 
President’s physical and mental condition.”123 Lawrence Conrad, chief counsel to the Senate for 
Constitutional Amendments during the 1960s and chief of staff on Senator Bayh’s committee 
                                               
115 Birch E. Bayh, Jr., The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its History and Meaning, in 1 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT BY SIX MEDICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL AUTHORITIES 1, 17 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 
1988). 
116 Id. at 20–21. 
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on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, noted that “[t]he only situation in which . . . the Twenty-fifth 
Amendment is completely defective is in cases involving psychiatric impairment” because it 
would be impossible to remove the President from office while he was having psychotic 
episodes not severe enough or consistent enough for any one person in the Cabinet to gather 
enough data to make the determination of inability.124  
 
This statement suggests that the drafters of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were counting on 
the Vice President and Principal Officers’ ability, based on their personal interactions with the 
President, to accumulate on their own sufficient evidence of the President’s mental inability to 
discharge the official duties of the office. In other parts of the United States government, co-
workers similarly accumulate evidence of an official employee’s fitness for duty. Mental health 
standards and periodic “fitness-for-duty” testing for (and surveillance of) conditions related to 
mental health and reliability may be more rigorous for persons in positions of grave 
responsibility, such as military personnel with responsibility related to nuclear weapons.125 
In 1988, a conference held at the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and 
chaired by former Attorney General Herbert Brownell and former Senator Birch Bayh, revisited 
the subject of a medical panel determining presidential inability. 126  Many of the speakers 
expressed reservations about the idea of a panel of physicians determining presidential 
inability.127 For example, Dr. Kenneth Crispell, Dean and Vice President for Health Affairs at the 
University of Virginia Medical School, expressed the opinion that “the question is really one of 
judgment and it is difficult for anyone to decide about his [the President’s] judgment.”128 The 
report that resulted from the conference (the “Miller Report”) ultimately recommended against 
creating a medical body to determine presidential inability.129  
 
                                               
124 Memorandum from Dr. Carlos Gomez to Dr. Kenneth Crispell (Mar. 26, 1984), in 4 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY 
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Feerick has gone on to advocate against establishing a more formal role for the White House 
physician in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment process, on the grounds that doing so could 
undermine the President’s confidence in those who serve him medically, which is necessary to 
ensure the full exchange of information necessary for proper medical care.130 He also notes that 
the White House physician may be particularly unable to offer useful advice if his or her medical 
specialty is not applicable to the particular circumstances of a President’s medical condition, or 
if the inability stemmed from non-medical circumstances, such as a kidnapping that prevented 
a President from communicating with the White House.131 
 
In conclusion, the Amendment’s drafters clearly anticipated that medical evidence would likely 
be useful to—and an important input in—determining the President’s ability or inability. Just as 
clearly, however, they did not intend that an independent medical panel should be the ultimate 
decision-maker as to the broader question whether, under the Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, the President was unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 
 
3. Psychiatric Evidence of Mental Inability and “The Goldwater Rule” 
Section 7.3 of the American Psychiatric Association’s Principles of Medical Ethics, known 
commonly as “The Goldwater Rule,” has been the subject of recent controversy in connection 
with the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.132 Section 7.3 provides that with regard to public figures, “a 
psychiatrist may share with the public his or her expertise about psychiatric issues in general,” 
but that “it is unethical for a psychiatrist to offer a professional opinion unless he or she has 
conducted an examination and has been granted proper authorization for such a statement.”133 
We make no comment on the contours or the wisdom of Section 7.3. But in light of the special 
attention Section 7.3 has recently received in the media, we briefly touch on it here to explain 
why we do not believe that the Goldwater Rule poses a significant obstacle to the proper 
implementation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
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First, as already noted, the Amendment does not require medical diagnosis or expertise at all. 
While medical evidence may prove helpful to establishing whether a President is disabled, a 
mental-illness diagnosis is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for that determination. 
A President may be found to be “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” 
without any diagnosis of mental illness. 134  Likewise, a President with a diagnosable mental 
illness may be perfectly able to discharge the powers and duties of his office.135  
 
Second, Section 7.3 is not law, but the internal rule of a professional association. As a result, 
Section 7.3 presents no formal legal obstacle to any aspect of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
process. The rule’s existence is relevant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment only to the extent 
that it may, in some cases, make it more difficult to procure the psychiatric evaluation or 
testimony necessary to making a finding of presidential inability.  
 
Third, if a disabled President were to refuse to be examined or insisted upon being examined 
only by a doctor or doctors of his own choosing, the Goldwater Rule could theoretically make it 
more difficult to obtain psychiatric evidence relevant to a finding of presidential inability under 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. But in such a circumstance, Congress could still 
continue with implementation of the Amendment.  Congress would need to exercise 
compulsory process, including requiring a medical examination, to obtain direct medical 
evidence regarding whether the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office.136  
 
 
III. The Transmission of the Declaration of Presidential Inability  
 
By its own terms, Section 4 envisions three “declarations” and “transmi[ssions].”   
 
1. The initial transmission [“Initial Declaration of Inability”] is made when the Vice 
President and a majority of either the Principal Officers of the Executive Departments 
or of the ‘other body’ designated by law “transmit to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that 
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”   
 
2. In response, the President may “transmit[] to the President pro tempore of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability 
exists” (“Responsive Presidential Declaration of No Inability”). 
 
3. The President would then resume the powers and duties of his office unless, within four 
days, the Vice President and a majority of either the Principal Officers of the Executive 
Departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide transmit to the 
President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
their written declaration [“Second Declaration of Inability”] that the President is unable 
                                               
134 See generally supra Sections II.A and II.B.1-2. 
135  See, e.g., Jonathan R. T. Davidson et al., Mental Illness in U.S. Presidents between 1776 and 1974: A Review of 
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to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”137 Congress is then given 21 days to 
decide the dispute. 
  
This section gives our best reading of what this language was intended to signify, and 
how the various transmissions it describes should be executed. The following graphic 
presents the chronology of events in pictorial form:138 
 
 
A. What form should a Section 4 declaration take?  
 
Each Section 4 declaration of the President’s inability must come from both the Vice President 
and the Principal Officers or other body, although either may initiate the declaration.139 In form, 
a Section 4 declaration would resemble those submitted under Section 3, where the President 
declares his own pending inability (the three existing historical examples may be found in 
Appendix I below). These declarations are short but provide a brief explanation of the 
temporary inability. They state clearly that the President will be unable to discharge his powers 
and duties (in all of the listed examples, because of a planned medical procedure), and that the 
Vice President shall discharge those powers and duties as Acting President until another 
declaration is transmitted. Using President George W. Bush’s 2007 Section 3 letter as a model, 
a Section 4 letter would likely look like this: 
 
Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary Transfer of the Powers and Duties of the 
President of the United States (Date of Transmission) 
                                               
137 If a second declaration of inability has not been properly transmitted at the end of those four days, the President 
resumes his powers and duties. 
138  Graphic developed by Varun Char, YLS ’19. 
139 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 79–80; FEERICK, supra note 9, at 118. 
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Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) 
 
In accordance with the provisions of Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, this letter shall constitute my written declaration that the Vice President 
and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments [or of such other body as 
Congress may by law provide] have determined that the President is unable to discharge the 
Constitutional powers and duties of the office of the President of the United States. Pursuant 
to Section 4, and as specified by that provision, I shall discharge those powers and duties as 
Acting President until further notice. 
 
Sincerely, 
[Signature of Vice President] 
Vice President of the United States 
 
B. When does the Vice President become Acting President? 
 
The Vice President becomes Acting President as soon as the initial transmission is made to (and 
not from the moment of receipt by) the House Speaker and Senate President pro tempore.140 
The four-day period that would follow the initial transmission and the transition of power to 
the Acting President is intended to give the Vice President and Principal Officers time to make 
a determination about whether the President has recovered from his or her inability.141 The 
second transmission could therefore potentially describe these additional steps taken. 
However, there is no indication that it would be required to do so.  
 
The second transmission could either declare the President able again, in which case, the 
President would resume his powers and duties as soon as Second Declaration is sent. 
Alternatively, the second transmission could declare that the President is still unable to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office, in which case the next stage, in which Congress 
becomes the decisionmaker, would commence. If the Vice President and Principal Officers (or 
other body) do not respond to the President’s assertion of No Inability by sending a Second 
Declaration of Inability within four days, the President resumes the powers and duties of the 
office. 
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Succession, 9 Op. O.L.C. 65, 69 (1985) (concluding that “we believe that under both §§ 3 and 4 of the Amendment, the 
transfer of authority to the Vice President takes effect ‘immediately’ when the declaration is transmitted or sent, 
and is not delayed until receipt of the document by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
House. Although the question is not free from doubt, the language and the history of the Amendment tend to 
support this conclusion”) (emphasis added). In addition, the Amendment’s later stipulation that Congress act “within 
twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration” further supports the notion that transmission in this 
context is the operative legal event, which is distinct from and does not require, receipt. See also 1965 House Judiciary 
Hearings, supra note 13, at 46 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“It was the feeling of the committee—and our report so 
states—that transmittal to the offices of the presiding officers of each House shall be sufficient constructive notice 
for the transferral [sic] of power, and that the time lapse involved in transmitting this notice from 1600 Pennsylvania 
Avenue to Capitol Hill is sufficiently short that it would not be something to concern ourselves with and would 
guarantee public notice for the entire country.”) (emphasis added). 
141 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 86. 
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C. What role should the Department of Justice and the White House Counsel
play in this process?
The Department of Justice would presumably represent the Vice President and Principal 
Officers in most cases, at least in the initial stage of the proceedings, presumably assisted by 
the Vice President’s staff (including any legal counsel).  According to former Attorney General 
Herbert Brownell’s testimony in the House hearings on the Amendment, “Undoubtedly the 
Justice Department would prepare the papers [regarding transmission of inability], and the 
action would be taken at a joint meeting of the Vice President and the Cabinet members.”142  
After transmission occurs, the White House Counsel will represent the Vice President as Acting 
President. As noted above, immediately after the transmission of the determination to the 
Speaker and President pro tempore, the Vice President assumes the powers and duties of the 
office as Acting President. The House Judiciary Committee hearings on the Amendment 
indicated that the Vice President, as Acting President, would assume the “benefits and 
privileges of the office of President,” including the White House staff.143 Because the White 
House Counsel serves the “Office of the Presidency” rather than the president in his individual 
capacity,144 the White House Counsel would thus represent whomever held the powers and 
duties of the presidency at any particular time. Thus, after the Vice President became the Acting 
President, the White House Counsel would most likely report to the Acting President as his or 
her principal client, and would do so at any point in the process where there was an Acting 
President.  
What is less clear, however, is precisely who the White House Counsel would represent during 
the period before the Vice President and Principal Officers made their initial declaration of 
inability. In theory, the sitting President would have the first claim on the Counsel’s service 
during this time. Under some circumstances, however, the President might choose instead 
during this period to work with outside counsel, while the White House  Counsel could continue 
to represent the Office of the Presidency on continuing matters of state. In general, however, 
the White House Counsel’s duty of representation would be to the sitting President before the 
sending of an initial Section 4 transmission. 
D. Who would represent the President during the period when he is no longer
exercises his official duties?
We believe that under the best reading of the Amendment, the Department of Justice and the 
White House Counsel would serve the Acting President. Commentators have generally not 
discussed who would represent the President during a period when he or she is removed from 
exercising his or her formal powers and duties. It could be expected that the selection of 
counsel for the President and Vice President during this process might be somewhat ad hoc.145 
142 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 247. Depending on the circumstances, however, the Department 
of Justice may not become involved.  For example, if the Vice President thinks that the Attorney General will oppose 
the Principal Officers’ determination that the President is unable and alert a hostile President of the potentially 
impending Section 4 invocation, the Vice President is unlikely to seek the Attorney General’s (or the Department of 
Justice’s) assistance in preparing the transmission. 
143  But see 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 88 (noting that a concurrent resolution may be required 
“authorizing [the Vice President] to have the salary and use the benefits of the White House.”). 
144 See generally Bob Bauer, Thoughts on the Proper Role of the White House Counsel, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2017 9:02 
AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-proper-role-white-house-counsel.  
145 Conversation with Joel K. Goldstein, Professor of Law, St. Louis Univ. Sch. of Law (Oct. 26, 2017). 
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The White House Counsel has represented the president in past impeachment proceedings.146 
However, impeachment proceedings are different from an exercise of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment in an important way: the President retains his “powers and duties” during 
impeachment proceedings. During an impeachment, there is no separate Acting President 
whose interests were potentially adverse to those of the President.  
 
E. Section 4 refers to a transmission to be made “within four days” in the case 
of a contested determination of ineligibility (and a determination to be 
made “within twenty-one days” of the transmission). Are these calendar 
days or business days? 
 
These “days” are calendar days.  
 
This interpretation is consistent with the meaning of the word “days” elsewhere in the 
Constitution. Article I, Section 7 states:  
 
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays 
excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in 
like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment 
prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.147 
 
If “days” in Article I, Section 7 meant “business days,” there would be no need to exclude 
Sundays. By analogy, the absence of any qualification to the word “days” in the Twenty Fifth 
Amendment strongly implies that these are calendar days.  
 
At various points in the legislative history, the timeline for this process was debated and the 
number of days allocated changed.148 But at no point during these discussions was the use of 
business days or the exception of Sundays discussed, implying that the days referred to are 
calendar days. In addition, drafters justified one change to a draft of the Amendment—
extending the Vice President and Principal Officers’ response time from two to three days—on 
the grounds that Congress would not be in session over the weekend, and a declaration 
submitted on Friday should wait until Monday for a response.149 Taken as a whole, all of this 
evidence strongly suggests that the drafters intended “days” to refer to calendar days. 
 
This interpretation is consistent with the fact that “twenty-one days” is exactly three weeks, a 
natural division of time when dealing with calendar days, but an arbitrary period when 
considered in business days. This interpretation of the word “days” is also consistent with the 
other provisions of the Amendment that require Congress to act with great expediency. 
                                               
146 For example, during the Clinton impeachment proceedings, Associate White House Counsel Cheryl Mills, White 
House Counsel Charles Ruff, and Special Counsel to the White House Gregory Craig led President Bill Clinton’s 
defense team. See Defense Who’s Who, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/clinton/defense.htm.  
147 U.S. CONST. art. I, §7 (emphasis added). 
148 See FEERICK, supra note 9, at 86 (noting that an initial draft of the Amendment provided for a two-day period in 
which the Vice President and Cabinet could challenge a President’s claimed recovery); id. at 100 (noting that the 
twenty-one day timeline for Congress emerged from a compromise in the Conference Committee between a ten-
day timeline suggested by the House, and the omission of a timeline entirely by the Senate); Feerick, supra note 3, at 
1094–99 (offering a firsthand account of the evolution of the time limit during the drafting process).  
149 See 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 149. 
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Section 4 mandates Congress to assemble within forty-eight hours. This is the only instance 
where the word “hours” is used in the Constitution, and suggests that the framers wanted to 
prioritize expediency in such situations, without reference to days of the week. The legislative 
history explicitly emphasizes the need for great expediency in general. When debating the 
timeline within which Congress should make its determination, the Senate emphasized the 
need to determine as quickly as possible who was President. They discussed, among other 
things, whether or not Congress should be allowed to conduct any other business before 
reaching a determination. Rhode Island Senator John O. Pastore stated “we must stay here until 
we decide that question, even if we must sit around the clock, or around the calendar, because 
this problem involves the Presidency of the United States.”150 
 
F. Could a Twenty-Fifth Amendment proceeding overlap two sessions of 
Congress?  
 
Probably yes. There is a very real possibility that proceedings under the Amendment could 
begin under one session of Congress and continue into another (with a different composition 
of membership). A similar “lame-duck scenario” occurred when the House impeached President 
Clinton in 1998, but the trial in the Senate did not take place until January 1999, under a new 
Congress.  
 
Some scholars had argued that the Constitution does not allow the old House to impeach and 
the new Senate to convict, because if the current House approves an ordinary bill which the 
Senate does not approve by the time the current Congress ends, then the bill dies.151 Arguably, 
this reasoning could apply in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment context, as well. However, this 
theory has largely been rejected, even in the context of impeachment, on the basis that 
impeachment is an adjudicative, rather than legislative, procedure.152 There have been several 
occasions, documented by the Library of Congress, in which a lame-duck House impeached a 
federal judge and a subsequent Senate held the trial.153 Congress’s Section 4 role is, similarly, 
more adjudicative than legislative. In any event, because the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
nowhere requires that proceedings under it must be completed in one Congress, while a “lame-
duck” implementation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might have political implications, it is 
unlikely to violate any legal stricture. 
 
  
                                               
150 111 CONG. REC. 3276 (1965). 
151 See, e.g., Impeachment Inquiry, William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, Presentation on Behalf of 
the President: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 37–38 (1998) (statement of Prof. Bruce 
Ackerman) (arguing, by analogy to the legislative process, that a bill of impeachment should lapse when the 
Congress that enacted it expires).  
152 See also RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 
128–29 (1999); Susan Low Bloch, Assessing the Impeachment of President Bill Clinton from a Post 9/11 Perspective, in 
THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 206–207 (Rosanna Perotti ed. 2012). 
153  Can a Lame Duck House Impeach the President? SLATE: EXPLAINER (Dec. 10, 1998), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/1998/12/can_a_lame_duck_house_impeach_the_pre
sident.html. 
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IV. The Powers and Duties of the Vice President as “Acting President” 
After theInitial Declaration of Presidential Inability 
 
Once an initial determination of inability is transmitted, the Vice President “shall immediately 
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.”  One important question is 
what the precise role and responsibilities of the Acting President are while the President is 
deemed unable. As noted above (in the case of President Tyler), there is an important 
distinction between the Vice President actually assuming the office of the presidency (as is 
envisioned in Section 1 of the Amendment) and assuming the powers and duties of the office as 
Acting President during a period of presidential inability.  
 
Prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, there was persistent uncertainty about “whether a vice 
president acting in place of a disabled president had ousted him from office.”154 Without a 
mechanism for deeming a President disabled, the inclination—illustrated in several of the 
historical cases discussed above—was to neglect or conceal any inability on the part of the 
President. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment created a mechanism for the Vice President to 
assume temporarily but openly the responsibilities of the presidency, without explicitly 
replacing the President. But the relatively untested nature of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
particularly Section 4, leaves open questions about whether there are any limitations or 
restrictions on the Acting President, as well as when precisely the Acting President is exercising 
control under Section 4.  
 
Historians and scholars of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, as well as the drafting history of the 
Amendment itself, have clarified several points. 
First, while the Acting President may be legally 
permitted to exercise the full powers of the office 
of the President, he or she is limited in practice by 
the structure of the executive branch, political 
norms, and the expectation that the President will 
return to the office. If, however, the Vice 
President’s installation as Acting President is 
believed to be permanent, those restrictions are 
likely to relax. Second, while some have argued for 
a possible reading of Section 4 that would allow 
the President to regain control during the crucial 
four days following his or her responsive 
transmission of a declaration that no inability 
exists, the legislative history clearly demonstrates 
that the Acting President would remain in control during that four-day period following the 
Initial Declaration of Inability. While Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been 
invoked, President Reagan’s functional delegation of authority following an assassination 
attempt in 1981 (see above) provides a useful case study for envisioning how the Vice President 
may fulfill the role of Acting President—and how he is constrained in doing so—in the case of an 
unexpected presidential inability. 
 
                                               
154 Herbert L. Abrams, Shielding the President from the Constitution: Disability and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 23 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533, 535 (Summer 1993); see also FEERICK, supra note 7, at 92-96. 
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A. Are the powers and duties of the Acting President coextensive with those 
of the office of the President?  
 
In a purely legal sense, as Acting President, the Vice President can employ all the powers and 
tools of the office of the president.155 Historians have characterized the Acting President as 
playing “a critical role as decisionmaker,”156 and “tak[ing] care of the day-to-day business”157 of 
the White House. The Acting President has the constitutional authority to “move the troops, 
report on the State of the Union, propose a new budget, send judicial nominees to the Senate 
for confirmation, remove the secretary of the treasury, do virtually all the things that presidents 
do. He might even prepare to control his national party apparatus and to secure its presidential 
nomination.”158  
 
While the breadth of the Acting President’s legal powers might appear to create a temptation 
to arrogate power through Section 4, the Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability 
dismissed that risk on the basis that such behavior would be at odds with the historical and 
practical role of the Vice President in the White House. The Commission noted that, historically, 
“the defects of the American vice presidency have not included the temptation to seize power, 
but the refusal to accept the power inherent in the office.”159 Professor Joel Goldstein, an expert 
on both the Vice-Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment  has argued along similar lines 
that “[h]istory had suggested that vice-presidential timidity was a greater problem than vice-
presidential aggression,” and that “[a] politically ambitious vice president would seem unlikely 
to risk his political future by seeking to supplant the president improvidently.”160 In the case of 
an invocation of Section 4, political pressure to appear to act modestly and incrementally would 
                                               
155 Less well-explored is the question whether the Acting President’s powers are limited to those of the President: 
some legislative history indicates that, when the Vice President becomes Acting President he or she might no longer 
exercise all of the powers of the Vice Presidency. In particular, Senator Bayh briefly indicated that the Acting 
President would not preside as President of the Senate, with that office falling instead to the President pro tempore. 
See 111 CONG. REC. 3270 (1965). There are also structural and separation-of-powers reasons why the Acting President 
would lose the ability to preside over the Senate. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, 
Textualism, and Populism, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1660–61 (1997) (explaining the structural reasons, based on the 
distinctions between presidential and parliamentary systems and norms about judging one’s own case, why the 
Constitution would not allow the Acting President to preside over the Senate). The Constitution’s text, however, 
remains silent on this issue, and the Constitution does not permit the Acting President to appoint a Vice President. 
See infra Section VII.F. In any event, the Acting President will likely face political pressure not to preside over the 
Senate, particularly while the Senate debates the President’s inability. Should the Acting President preside as 
President of the Senate, the Acting President risks appearing to judge the validity of his or her own determination 
that the President of the United States cannot discharge the powers and duties of that office.   
156 Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in 
MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 191 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000). 
157 Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 8. 
158 Goldstein, supra note 156, at 198. While Goldstein is here discussing the actions of a potential acting president 
who has replaced a permanently disabled president, he makes clear that such actions are coextensive with acting 
presidents’ full legal authority.  
159 Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 8-9 (“Examples are Vice President Chester Arthur during President 
James Garfield’s long illness after an assassin shot him, and Vice President Thomas Marshall during President 
Woodrow Wilson's grave illness. After President Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack, Vice President Nixon scrupulously 
avoided any act not clearly authorized by the president. In Nixon's case, and ever since, the tempo of modern 
communications has assured wide and swift public disclosure of the least sign of a ‘power grab.’”).  
160 Goldstein, supra note 156, at 194. Then-Vice President Bush’s refusal to invoke Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment after President Reagan was shot, which resulted in government by an ad-hoc committee of unelected 
aides to the President, represents a prime illustration of this vice-presidential reluctance to assume the Presidency. 
See supra Section II.A.2.g.i. 
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restrain the Acting President in his or her ability to wield power independently, much less 
consolidate power. 
 
While the Acting President’s power may be equal to 
the President’s in legal terms, he is functionally limited 
by informal, structural, normative, and political 
constraints. First, because the Acting President does 
not have an independent electoral mandate, there are 
limits “imposed in part by the knowledge that the 
president, not the vice president, was elected to do the 
job.” 161  Professor Goldstein argues that as “the vice 
president is his hand-picked associate, . . . [t]he 
president need anticipate no political self-dealing or 
other shenanigans while he is incapacitated.”162 Social 
expectations of propriety will also limit the Acting 
President. For example, even an Acting President who is expected to serve for an extended 
period would lack “the title and some of the trappings” of the presidency.163 Although there are 
no formal guidelines, Goldstein has argued, it would be “imprudent” for the Vice President to 
move into the White House, or use the Oval Office, Air Force One, or Camp David.164 
 
More importantly, the Acting President is limited by virtue of the fact that he is working within 
the existing personnel structure of the sitting President’s White House. The White House Chief 
of Staff, the presidential advisors, and the President’s family (still presumably occupying the 
residence) would all serve as checks on the actions of the Acting President, who would be 
unlikely to bring in the vice-presidential staff to replace the President’s. The very concept of the 
“Acting President” assumes that it is a mechanism to maintain the existing organization and 
priorities of the sitting President’s administration.  
 
This view is consistent with the notion that the presidency is not a single individual, but rather, 
in the words of presidential advisor Martin Anderson, a “pyramid of individuals who are built up 
under him.”165 When the Vice President assumes the office of the President, he might substitute 
or introduce members of his own staff, resulting in a “radically different pyramid.”166 But in the 
case of a temporary inability, the Acting President would ordinarily be expected to leave the 
President’s standing pyramid alone, “rather than risk the disorder from a group not aware of all 
the nuances of the problems confronting the country.”167  
 
In addition, because the Vice President has presumably worked closely with the President and 
his advisors, he would be expected to govern consistent with current administration policy.168 
                                               
161 Id. at 198. 
162 Id. at 189. 
163 Id. at 198-99. 
164  Id. On the other hand, in the Letter Agreement between President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon, 
Eisenhower specifically indicated his intention that the Vice President would assume the “perquisites of the 
Presidency, including the White House itself.” Fordham University School of Law's Clinic on Presidential Succession, 
Report, Ensuring the Stability of Presidential Succession in the Modern Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 77–79 (2012) (quoting 
Letter from Pres. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Vice Pres. Richard Milhous Nixon (Feb. 5, 1958)). 
165 Abrams, supra note 154, at 541 (quoting Martin Anderson). 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  at 542 (quoting Martin Anderson). 
168 Goldstein, supra note 156, at 189. 
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The Acting President’s ability to shift course would likely be impeded by staff who are loyal to 
the President. For example, the spouse of the President, the Chief of Staff, or other advisors 
could easily undermine the status of a defiant Acting President “with a public rebuke or a few 
whispered comments to [insider journalists like] Geraldo [Rivera] or Bob Woodward.”169  
 
Plainly, the most powerful check on the Acting President’s ability to exercise control is the 
understanding and expectation that his role is temporary. Political scientist Clinton Rossiter has 
argued that there is little ambiguity in such a case: “[T]he only thing a Vice President can do, so 
long as there is the slightest chance that the President will recover, is to keep shop.”170 Most 
scholars of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment contend that the Acting President’s duties should 
not vary greatly from the Vice President’s ordinary responsibilities. According to Professor 
Goldstein, in a situation where the President will likely return soon and no emergent matter 
requires urgent presidential decision, the Acting President “would not take any other action as 
acting president that she could not take as vice president.”171 While the Acting President “might 
receive a head of state or preside over a White House meeting,” “she could (and does) do these 
things as vice president. . . . Her power, as a practical matter, is much reduced under these 
circumstances.”172 Goldstein argues that if time is of the essence or there is an emergency, the 
Acting President will be compelled to act for the President, for example, in responding to a 
nuclear attack or signing a bill that may be set to expire imminently.  
 
However, if the inability is only temporary, it is “virtually inconceivable” that the Acting 
President would take actions that could practically await the return of the President, including 
the naming of a nominee to the Supreme Court, issuing executive orders, or firing the chief of 
staff.173 In addition, the Vice President would have little to gain from striking out on his own 
during his tenure as Acting President. Credit for sound, decisive action during this period will 
likely go to the President—or as likely, his team—while blame for any failure would almost 
certainly be directed at the Vice President.174 
 
The possible exception to these constraints is if the presidential inability appears to be 
permanent. If, for example, the President lapses into a prolonged coma, then the Acting 
President effectively (if not officially) assumes not only the powers and duties, but also the 
office of the president. President John Tyler’s full assumption of the presidency following the 
death of President William Henry Harrison provided the blueprint for such a reallocation of 
power, later codified in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. When Tyler received his first 
communications addressed to the Acting President, he “took one look and without hesitation 
struck the word acting. It was clear that John Tyler fully intended to be President for the 
remainder of [the late] Harrison’s term.”175 This came to be known as the “Tyler Precedent,” and 
when a President died in the future, it was presumed that the Vice President would assume “the 
full office as well as its powers and duties.”176 However, it was agreed during the first hearings 
in 1955 on presidential inability that such protocol needed to be clarified.177 Section 1 of the 
                                               
169 Id. at 191. 
170 Id. at 200. 
171 Id. at 199. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. at 200. 
175 BAYH, supra note 29, at 14. 
176 Id. 
177 Abrams, supra note 154, at 535. 
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Twenty-Fifth Amendment did just that by specifying that the Vice President would become 
President—not merely Acting President—in the case of the President’s death, resignation, or 
removal from office.178  
 
The Tyler Precedent raised questions in the 27th Congress about whether or not it created an 
opening for a Vice President to also assume the presidency in the case of disability, not death. 
“Under Tyler’s precedent, would a temporarily disabled President be permitted to return to 
office once he recovered, if the Vice President were to insist on keeping the office for 
himself?” 179  Members of Congress were concerned that if the Tyler Precedent applied to 
disability, then a president who recovers might have trouble regaining his office. Congress 
continued to debate the question for over a century, but never reached a consensus.180 This was 
one of the chief concerns animating the drafting of Sections 3 and 4 of the Amendment.  
 
Nevertheless, the Acting President has the full 
legal powers of the President. If there is an 
expectation that the President will never return, 
then even if he retains the legal title, the Vice 
President would be freed from many of the 
informal constraints that come with being only 
a temporary Acting President, and would likely 
feel at liberty to exert the full range of 
presidential powers. Professor Goldstein writes 
that “[a]s a practical matter, the common 
realization that the president is not coming back 
frees the vice president to act across a wide 
range. He need not feel inhibited by the specter 
that the president will return and second-guess 
his actions.”181 This view is compatible with the 
vision of Senator Bayh, who wrote that in the 
case of a clear permanent removal of the 
President—for example, by death or resignation—whether the Vice President serves as 
President or Acting President “is really a matter of semantics.”182 While the Vice President’s 
official status may not have changed, where the President is permanently disabled, the Acting 
President will likely be much less encumbered and may have significantly greater latitude to 
install his own staff members in the West Wing and shape the administration’s agenda. 
  
B. What are the powers of the Vice President during the four days after a 
President’s responsive declaration of “No Inability”? 
 
He serves as Acting President. The President may contest an initial Section 4 determination 
that he is “unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office” by submitting a responsive, 
written declaration to the Senate pro tempore and the Speaker of the House asserting that “no 
                                               
178 Id. at 537. 
179 BAYH, supra note 29, at 14. 
180 RUTH SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 87 (1968). 
181 Goldstein, supra note 156, at 198. 
182 BAYH, supra note 29, at 15. 
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[such] inability exists”183  (the President’s responsive declaration of “no inability”). The Vice 
President, along with either the majority of the Principal Officers or of the duly appointed “other 
body,” then has four days to challenge the President’s responsive declaration.  If they decide to 
do so, they must submit another declaration (Second Declaration of Inability) reaffirming that 
the President is unfit for office. It would then fall to “Congress . . . [to] decide the issue” of fitness 
for duty.184 
 
Although the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is clear that the Acting President is in charge during a 
period of presidential inability, there has been some debate regarding the four days after the 
President transmits a declaration attesting to a lack of inability, prior to the Vice President and 
the Principal Officers’ formal contest. In relevant part, Section 4 states:  
 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration 
that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless 
the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
department[s] or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit 
within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.185  
 
The most natural reading of Section 4 is that the Acting 
President remains in control during the four days after 
the President’s declaration of “no inability.” However, 
some legal experts have interpreted the sentence to 
reinstate the President during that period. 186  The 
variance revolves around the word “unless.” According 
to Professor Brian Kalt, the word “unless” has 
unnecessarily led to divergent readings: “unless” could 
potentially be read to mean “unless and until,” in which 
case the president would resume power until he was 
contested. 187  Someone defending the President might 
also argue that if the Vice President were meant to retain presidential powers and duties during 
those four days, he would be referred to in this text as the “Acting President,” because all other 
references to the Vice President when he is assigned the powers and duties of the presidency 
so refer to him. But these textual arguments in favor of the President resuming the duties of the 
office seem tenuous, and do not accord with the plain meaning of Section 4’s text. “Unless,” 
                                               
183 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
184 Id. 
185 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4 (emphasis added).  
186 Professor Brian C. Kalt discusses two legal experts’ misstatement of the law in their critiques of the way that § 4 
was portrayed on the television drama 24. Professor Peter Shane insisted that the president can reclaim the office 
by providing certification to Congress of no disability, and that it was only after that transmission that the vice 
president could “re-oust the President.” Legal expert Gregory Jacob wrote that the President “could nullify the 
Cabinet’s decision and reinstate himself simply by declaring himself fit to resume his duties.” BRIAN C. KALT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CLIFFHANGERS: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR PRESIDENTS AND THEIR ENEMIES 72 (2012). 
187 Id. at 68.  
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after all, is not commonly understood to mean “unless or until”—it is purely conditional, and has 
no temporal component.188 
 
Moreover, the Amendment’s legislative history shows clearly that Congress intended for the 
Vice President, as Acting President, to remain in charge during those four days. The number of 
days changed several times during the course of drafting the Amendment, but the intention of 
keeping the Vice President in charge as Acting President remained the same. 189  It was 
understood that the Vice President would remain in control during that entire period.190 Indeed, 
an earlier version of the Amendment explicitly put the Vice President in charge during the 
waiting period, which in that particular draft lasted seven days.191 
 
The subsequent edits made to the language of Twenty-Fifth Amendment as it moved through 
the Senate were meant to make the Amendment more concise, but not to alter its meaning. 
Kalt writes that “[e]ven as the phrasing changed between drafts, that intention did not.”192 
When the Amendment was debated on the Senate floor, the issue was expressly raised. Senator 
Allott inquired: “[S]o the issue will be clear, if a Vice President had assumed the duties of acting 
President, and the elected President then decided that he wished to state that there is no 
inability any longer, it would be 7 days before he could possibly resume the office of President.” 
Senator Bayh responded: “That is correct.” Allott then affirmed Bayh’s answer, stating, “There is 
no question about that. That is the intent.”193  
 
The legislative record makes clear that Congress was in part concerned about a structural 
issue: that if power shifted back to the President during those four days, the President might 
attempt to use those official powers to prevent the Vice President and Principal Officers from 
countering his “no inability” declaration. In fact, when a representative in the House suggested 
changing the language to put the President in charge during the waiting period, the proposal 
failed due to concerns that, during that period, the President might fire his entire Cabinet to 
keep the Principal Officers from contesting his declaration.194 Senator Bayh affirmed that the 
drafters sought to keep to a minimum “the number of times the power of the Presidency would 
change” hands.195 
 
                                               
188  See Unless, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (2017), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unless 
(defining “unless” as “except on the condition that: under any other circumstance than” and “without the 
accompanying circumstance or condition that”).  
189 BAYH, supra note 29, at 283. The House originally called for a two-day window; Sen. Roman Hruska advocated for 
ten days, and the Senate then compromised at seven days, and later at four. 
190 Even Kalt admits that as far as evidence of legislative intent goes, “this is as clear and definitive as it gets.”  KALT, 
supra note 186, at 71. 
191  Draft language introduced in the Senate in 1963 and 1964 stated: “Whenever the President makes public 
announcement in writing that his inability has terminated, he shall resume the discharge of the powers and duties of 
his office on the seventh day after making such announcement, or at such earlier time after such announcement as 
he and the Vice President may determine. But if the Vice President, with the written approval of a majority of the 
heads of executive departments in office at the time of such announcement, transmits to the Congress his written 
declaration that in his opinion the President’s inability has not terminated, the Congress shall thereupon consider the 
issue.” FEERICK, supra note 9, at 72.  
192 KALT, supra note 186, at 69. 
193 KALT, supra note 186, at 70 (quoting 111 CONG. REC. 3,285). 
194 111 CONG. REC. 7963-66 (1965) (rejecting by a 122 to 58 vote a proposal from Rep. Moore that would have permitted 
the President to resume the powers and duties of the office during the waiting period); see also KALT, supra note 186, 
at 71 (citing 111 CONG. REC. 7963-66 (1965)). 
195 111 CONG. REC. 3285 (1965); see also KALT, supra note 186, at 70 (citing 111 CONG. REC. 3285 (1965)). 
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There is no clear consensus about whether and under what circumstances the President’s 
powers and duties may be restored before the four-day period has elapsed. Based on the 
legislative history, Dean Feerick argues that either the Vice President alone or the Vice 
President and a majority of the Principal Officers can agree to allow the President to resume his 
powers and duties before the four-day period expires. 196  However, in a prior draft of the 
Amendment, there was a waiver provision that allowed the Vice President to return power to 
the President immediately, but the waiver was removed.197 Kalt suggests that the only way to 
shorten the waiting period in practice would be for the Vice President and Principal Officers to 
immediately challenge the President’s assertion that an inability no longer exists, sending it 
directly to Congress where the Vice President could then ask Congress to promptly vote in the 
President’s favor, swiftly ending the period of uncertainty.198 As a practical matter, however, it 
may be just as likely that the Vice President and the Principal Officers would simply allow the 
President to resume his official functions, with any congressional vote merely confirming the 
return to the status quo ante. 
 
C. What are the powers and duties of the Vice President during the 21-day 
period in which Congress deliberates regarding the President’s ability or 
inability?  
 
The Vice President serves as Acting President. The Amendment’s text clearly indicates that 
should the Vice President and either the Principal Officers or the “other body” transmit a second 
declaration of inability to Congress following the President’s responsive declaration of no 
inability, the Vice President remains Acting President during the period allotted for 
Congressional deliberation. Further, the Amendment states that where Congress returns the 
required two-thirds vote “that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his 
office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President” after the 21-
day period (in which he serves as Acting President).199    
 
 
V. Congressional Process in the Event that Presidential Inability is 
Contested 
 
If, after an initial declaration of inability, (1) the President transmits a responsive declaration of 
“no inability,” and (2) the Vice President and a majority of either the Principal Officers of the 
executive departments or members of the “other body” then replies with a second declaration 
of inability, it falls to Congress to resolve the dispute.  The Amendment states:  
 
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours 
for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after 
receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within 
twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-
thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers 
and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same 
                                               
196 FEERICK, supra note 9,  at 119 (citing 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 99, 107, 243; 111 CONG. REC. 3285 
(1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 15,214 (statement of Rep. Poff)) 
197 KALT, supra note 186, at 73. 
198 Id. 
199 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4 (emphasis added). 
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as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties 
of his office. 
 
This Part discusses how the Congressional process would unfold in the event of a contested 
determination of inability. 
 
A. When does the 21-day “clock” commence? 
    
By its terms, the Amendment provides for two possibilities. If Congress is in session at the 
moment of “receipt of the latter written declaration” from the Vice President and Principal 
Officers or body,200 the 21-day period begins immediately. But if Congress is “not in session” at 
the moment the Speaker and president pro tempore receive the declaration, Congress must 
then “assembl[e] within forty-eight hours for [the] purpose” of deciding the question of 
whether the President is still disabled. 201  In that case, the 21-day clock then begins at the 
moment that “Congress is required to assemble” by the Vice President—no more than 48 hours 
after receipt of the second declaration. 202  Although the choice of 21 days was somewhat 
arbitrary, the congressional record leaves no doubt that there were two overarching reasons 
for mandating such a precise timeline—to induce Congress to act quickly while simultaneously 
giving it sufficient time to deliberate and collect evidence pertaining to the disability. 
 
1. When does “receipt” of the declaration occur? 
“[R]eceipt” of the declaration takes place when both the Speaker of the House and the Senate 
President pro tempore have received a written declaration from both the Vice President and 
either the majority of the Principal Officers or the majority of the body created by Congress that 
the President is still disabled.203 While the legislative history of the Amendment presumes that 
this declaration would be made jointly by the Vice President and the majority of the Principal 
Officers or duly appointed body, it is possible that they may “choose to send separate 
declarations.” 204  In that case, the requirement that the Speaker and pro tempore receive 
declarations from both the Vice President and the majority of the Principal Officers or other 
body would mean that the 21-day timeline (or 21 days plus 48 hours) would not be triggered 
until the receipt of the second of the two declarations.205 
  
                                               
200 Id. 
201 Id. 
202 Id.; John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173, 201 (1965). 
Senator Bayh would later say the 21-day deadline was chosen as a compromise because it “was half-way between 
the time the House wanted and the time the Senate wanted.” Bayh, supra note 115, at 19. 
203 Presumably, this second declaration by the Vice President must be made in conjunction with the same group with 
which he made the initial declaration. For instance, if the first was made with the majority of a body created by 
Congress, it is unlikely that the Vice President could then turn to the Principal Officers to make the second 
declaration.  
204 See FEERICK, supra note 9, at 118 (citing 111 CONG. REC. 15385 (1965) (statements of Sen. Bayh, Sen. Javits)). 
205 This is of course more likely to occur with the initial Section 4 declaration in the case of a national emergency 
where the President is incapacitated but known to be alive. 
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Under certain circumstances, the declaration could 
be delivered to either the Speaker or the President 
pro tempore but not both. This would most likely 
occur if one of these positions were vacant. A strict 
reading of the Amendment would seem to indicate 
that both the Speaker and the President pro tempore 
are indispensable as well; but if either position were 
vacant, no declaration could ever be received by the 
appropriate people, and thus no obligation could 
ever attach to Congress. We think it highly doubtful 
that the process was intended to be read so 
formalistically. The most straightforward reading 
would appear to be that the Amendment specified 
transmissions to the Speaker and President pro 
tempore as proxies for the requirement that 
Congress as a whole be notified of the declarations. 
Thus, even if the position of Speaker or President pro 
tempore were vacant, sending the second 
declaration of inability—by the Vice President and either a majority of the Principal Officers or of 
the other body—to Congress as a whole for its deliberation on the question of inability would 
probably suffice.   
 
2. When is Congress “in session”? 
Congress is in session when it says it is, provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity 
to transact official business. While it is clear that Congress is “in session on any particular day 
when it is meeting,” there are situations where this determination is more complex.206 Both 
Article I of the Constitution and the 20th Amendment mandate that Congress must “assemble 
at least once in every year.”207 As a result, each biennial Congress traditionally has held two 
formal sessions, each spanning a calendar year and beginning in early January and adjourning in 
late December.208 However, Congress often breaks for recesses in the midst of these sessions. 
The most prominent example of this is the August recess, which usually lasts longer than a 
month and has been a mainstay of the congressional calendar since the 1970 Legislative 
Reorganization Act.209 So while it is clear that Congress is not in session between adjournment 
and the start of its next session,210 whether or not it remains “in session” during intra-session 
recesses is a more difficult question. 
 
In 2014, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in NLRB v. Noel Canning, a case interpreting the 
Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. In doing so, it laid out a definition of “in 
session” that would logically seem to apply in the context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. 
Writing for a majority, Justice Breyer held that “the Senate is in session when it says it is, 
                                               
206 Sessions of Congress, U.S. SENATE (Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.senate.gov/reference/Index/Sessions.htm. 
207 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 4, cl. 2. 
208 For the exact dates that each Congress was formally in session, see Dates of Sessions of the Congress, U.S. SENATE 
(Nov. 11, 2017), https://www.senate.gov/reference/Sessions/sessionDates.htm.  
209 The August Recess, U. S. SENATE (Nov. 11, 2017), 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/News_August_Recess.htm. 
210 It is important to note that often there is no break between the adjournment of one session and the start of the 
next. See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, supra note 208. It is also possible for Congress to remain in session by 
holding pro forma sessions during an adjournment.  
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provided that, under its own rules, it retains the capacity to transact Senate business.”211 Under 
this definition, Congress would remain in session if it continued to hold pro forma sessions at 
least every three days, even during a lengthy intra-session recess.212 This is because during these 
sessions “the Senate retained the power to conduct business . . . simply by passing a unanimous 
consent agreement.”213 
 
Applying this standard to the 2017 congressional schedule, it appears that Congress was 
continually in session from January 3, 2017 to January 3, 2018. (It held pro forma sessions every 
Tuesday and Friday during the August recess.214) In modern practice, it is common for Congress 
not to adjourn between sessions until the start of the next session. 215  In that case, any 
declaration sent by the Vice President and the Principal Officers or other body would likely be 
considered to have been received while Congress was in session, thus immediately starting the 
21-day clock. 
 
If Congress is not in session when it receives the declaration, the Amendment mandates two 
things: first, that Congress convene within 48 hours, and second, that the 21-day clock begin 
once it “is required to assemble.” Fortunately, the legislative history is quite clear on how this 
timeline would work. Because the Vice President would, at this time, be Acting President, he 
would be expected to immediately exercise his Article II, Section 3 constitutional power to 
“convene both Houses” as quickly as possible given the circumstances.216 The 21-day timeframe 
would then begin at the time he instructed Congress to assemble. Alternatively, if the Vice 
President did not act, the 21-day clock would begin either when the Speaker and the President 
pro tempore call their houses into session or at the end of the 48-hour period, whichever came 
first.217 
 
To summarize, there are three key events that determine the timeline that Congress must 
follow if it is forced to decide the question of Presidential inability. First, the timeline is triggered 
upon “receipt” of a second declaration by the Vice President and the Principal Officers or other 
body proclaiming the President unfit for office. Second, whether the 21-day clock is immediately 
triggered depends on whether or not Congress is “in session.” If it is, this three-week 
deliberative period begins from the moment of receipt. Third, if Congress is not in session at the 
time, the three-week clock begins when Congress “is required to assemble,” by the Vice 
President, the Speaker and President pro tempore, or the text of the Amendment itself.  In any 
event, once Congress is back in session and in receipt of the second declaration, it should then 
turn to the question of the President’s ability to “discharge the powers and duties of his 
office.”218 
 
                                               
211 NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2574 (2014). While the court was clear in its stipulation that this was only 
for the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, this is still the fullest definition of what “in session” means that 
the court has given.  
212 Id. at 2557 (stating that for the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, “we cannot ignore these pro forma 
sessions” to hold that Congress was not in session). 
213 Id. at 2575. 
214  Days in Session of the U.S. Congress: 115th Congress, 1st Session, CONGRESS.GOV (Nov. 11, 2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/days-in-session. 
215 See Dates of Sessions of the Congress, supra note 208. 
216 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
217 For a fuller account of this process, see FEERICK, supra note 9, at 119. 
218 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
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B. Must two-thirds of each House vote separately, or is two-thirds of the
combined vote of both Houses sufficient to sustain a determination of
presidential inability?
The two houses vote separately. The joint 
conference report stated, “A vote of less than 
two-thirds by either House would immediately 
authorize the President to assume the powers 
and duties of his office.”219 In addition, the then-
Attorney General interpreted the text to 
mandate “a two-thirds vote . . . . of those 
Members in each House present and voting, a 
quorum being present.” 220  The White House 
Counsel’s office supported the theory that the vote does not require that all members be 
present, writing “Both the House and Senate Committee Reports support that view. . . both 
Reports note that this vote is in conformity with the Constitutional provision on impeachments. 
That provision provides for a two-thirds vote in the Senate of those members present.” 221 
Finally, the House report stated, “The committee contemplates that votes taken pursuant to 
the provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment will be conducted in accordance 
with the rules of the House and Senate, respectively, and that record votes may be taken when 
in conformity with such rules.”222 If the two-thirds vote does not take place within the required 
21-day period, power reverts to the President.223
C. Are the two Houses of Congress required to adhere to any particular
burden of proof in deciding inability?
 No. There is no particular burden of proof to 
which Congress is required to adhere in 
adjudicating the President’s inability. The Framers 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment deliberately gave 
the two houses of Congress wide latitude in how to 
arrive at their determination. The original Senate 
report stated, “The discussion of the committee 
made it abundantly clear that the proceedings in 
the Congress prescribed in section [4] would be 
pursued under rules prescribed, or to be prescribed, 
by the Congress itself.”224 
219 H.R. REP. NO. 89-564 (1965). 
220 S. REP. NO. 89-66 at 20 (1965). 
221 Memorandum from Associate White House Counsel Bobbie Greene Kilberg to President Gerald Ford, through 
Deputy White House Counsel Roderick M. Hills (Aug. 21, 1975), 
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0019/4520859.pdf. 
222 H.R. REP. NO. 89-203 at 14 (1965). 
223 See FEERICK, supra note 9 at 119–120. Congress also has the option of settling the issue in this manner; that is, 
choosing not to have a vote. Id. 
224 S. REP. NO. 89-66 at 3 (1965). 
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While there is no minimum level of deliberation required, Senator Bayh elaborated on how the 
debate might unfold. “Congress is sitting in judgment. You bring in the medical experts and 
constitutional authorities and . . . talk to the specific physicians that are dealing with the specific 
case. You can come to a more learned decision than would normally be the case.”225 He further 
said, “Oh yes, there would be a public debate . . . . I think [they] would call witnesses.”226 In 
describing the Senate report, he stated, “The Senate wanted a little more time because they felt 
they ought to make sure there was ample time to get all the evidence and to have hearings and 
have everybody operate on the basis of good, sound fact, not supposition.”227 Referring to the 
unregulated nature of the congressional proceedings, Senator Bayh said, “I must confess I am 
not completely comfortable with what would be going on in Congress during a debate like that. 
That is a horrible situation to try to envisage.”228 
In addition, there appears to be no burden of proof to justify a Congressional finding of 
presidential inability. The Senate Judiciary Committee report stated, “It is also the contention 
of this committee that the Congress should act swiftly in making this determination, but with 
sufficient opportunity to gather whatever evidence it determined necessary to make such a 
final determination.”229 Rep. Edward Hutchinson, who worked on the drafting process, stated, 
“the decision will be a political one. There is no suggestion that medical or psychiatric evidence 
even be considered.” 230  Senator Roman Hruska, a leading conservative involved in the 
amendment’s drafting, stated, “It would require no specific charge. It would not define the proof 
which is required. It would be a determination of facts with no guidelines against which to 
measure them.”231 
D. What procedures should Congress use to determine presidential inability?
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment creates no legal requirements for the procedures to be followed 
by Congress. Any dispute about Congress’s internal procedures for adjudicating presidential 
inability would almost certainly constitute a nonjusticiable political question.232 However, the 
procedures Congress uses to deliberate and decide whether the President is disabled under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment have the potential either to enhance or diminish significantly both 
the actual and perceived legitimacy of its decision. At a moment of unprecedented public 
attention and controversy, such legitimacy will be of paramount importance, and would likely 
be hotly contested.233 
With this in mind, the Presidential Succession Clinic at Fordham Law School examined potential 
congressional procedures and made recommendations that would enhance the process. We 
largely agree with that Clinic’s analysis and recommendations. To begin with, the Clinic listed 
five principles it believed should guide the procedures chosen for congressional deliberations: 
225 Bayh, supra note 115, at 17. 
226 Id. at 20. 
227 Id. at 31-32. 
228 Id. at 20. 
229 S. REP. NO. 89-66 (1965) at 3 (emphasis added). 
230 H.R. REP. NO. 89-203 at 19 (1965) (supplemental views of Rep. Edward Hutchinson). 
231 1965 Senate Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 33 (statement of Sen. Hruska). 
232 See infra Part VI. 
233 At the time of the Clinton impeachment, for instance, there was substantial criticism of the laxness of the 
impeachment rules of evidence and other procedural guarantees in Senate impeachment trials. See, e.g., POSNER, 
supra note 152, at 120-32. 
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maximizing (1) informed deliberations, (2) urgency and efficiency, (3) democratic and 
procedural legitimacy, (4) fairness to the President, and (5) a spirit of “constitutional morality” 
free from partisanship and self-interest.234  
In order to maximize legitimacy and avoid the unnecessary expenditure of parts of Congress’s 
21 days on procedural matters, the Fordham Clinic recommended that the procedures be 
formalized beforehand. 235  In terms of the format for the proceedings, the Fordham Clinic 
recommended a bipartisan joint committee, composed of members of the Senate Rules and 
House Judiciary committees, and working under expedited procedures.236  
This format has a number of advantages. Although joint committees are not the norm, they 
have been utilized to great effect in investigations of national importance, including those of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Iran-Contra Affair. 237  A joint committee would avoid 
duplicative procedures, which would maximize efficiency and legitimacy, ensure that both 
Houses make their determination based on the same set of facts, and eliminate potential 
unfairness to the President from having to make his case twice.238  
Because the Senate Rules and House Judiciary Committees have jurisdiction over presidential 
succession, drawing members at least largely from those committees would ensure that the 
procedures were guided by legislators and staff members with expertise in the area.239 Making 
the committee bipartisan would enhance both the perception—and the actual likelihood—that 
the proceedings would be guided by a spirit of “constitutional morality.”240 Legislators who are 
not members of the Joint Committee should be able to submit questions for the Joint 
Committee to pose to witnesses.241 And while documents and hearings should generally be 
public, certain evidence may be adduced behind closed doors, based on a majority vote of the 
Committee, for reasons of national security, presidential privacy, or presidential public image.242  
Finally, both the Committee’s deliberations and the debate and vote in each House should be 
governed by expedited procedures. The Clinic suggests that the Joint Committee should finish 
its investigation within the first sixteen days, leaving five days for each House to debate and 
vote on the issue.243 While the actual allotment of days is negotiable, we believe that another 
of the Clinic’s recommendations is of paramount importance: that during the debate-vote 
period, the filibuster be suspended in the Senate, so that all delaying tactics are discouraged in 
both Houses.244 
234 Fordham University School of Law Second Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 29, at 972–73. 
235 Id. at 971. 
236 Id. at 975–78. 
237 Id. at 975. 
238 Id. at 976. 
239 Id. at 976–77. 
240 Id.  
241 Id. at 977. 
242 Id. at 980–81. 
243 Id. at 977. 
244 Id. at 977–78. 
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E. What congressional powers are available to obtain or coerce evidence?
Congress has the same powers as in regular order. The Senate Judiciary Committee concluded 
that “Congress should be permitted to collect all necessary evidence and to participate in the 
debate needed to make a considered judgment.” 245  The use of the words “should” and 
“permitted” suggest that the framers of the Amendment expected that relevant parties would 
be responsive to congressional requests for evidence, but did not intend automatically to 
expand Congress’s power to gather evidence. One of Congress’s key powers is its power to 
convene hearings and issue subpoenas for witnesses. As Senator Hruska noted, Congress 
“would want evidence. They would be entitled to it. They would be entitled to have members 
of the Cabinet come before it to express their opinions and their report on observations of the 
President’s condition, health, and so on.”246 None of this suggests that Congress’s investigative 
powers are instantly enlarged during Twenty-Fifth Amendment proceedings. 
One obvious question is whether Congress can exercise compulsory process over the President, 
and in particular, his medical records. The legislative history on this issue is relatively sparse and 
somewhat ambiguous. Some of the language used by individual Senators seems to imply vague 
limits on its coercive power.247 Yet a more prevalent belief appears to have been that either 
house of Congress would have some degree of power to compel the President to comply or, 
faced with his refusal, could use that refusal as circumstantial evidence of his inability or at 
least, intransigence. In its report, the Senate Judiciary Committee made clear its feelings “that 
Congress should be permitted to collect all necessary evidence” to arrive at an appropriate 
conclusion.248 While it was “abundantly clear that the proceedings in Congress . . . would be 
pursued under rules prescribed, or to be prescribed, by the Congress itself,” the House hearings 
raised the possibility that these rules—and any legislation hindering its ability to collect the 
necessary evidence—could be lawfully amended during the 21-day period to facilitate its 
investigation.249 
Possible mechanisms for obtaining medical information have been discussed above. Specific to 
medical privacy, the House debates appear to be the only time the issue was raised. 
Congressman Rogers did raise his concern that “there is a confidential relationship between 
doctor and patient.”250 In response, Congressman Curtain proposed a workaround, where the 
President’s doctor would not be authorized to reveal “any previous history, but . . . [could] 
conduct an examination at this particular time on this particular question and testify to the 
court his findings. He could have been the doctor for the last 10 years, but he can still do it.”251 
Curtain implied that if the President’s personal doctor were too politically or emotionally 
245 S. REP. NO. 89-66 (1965) at 3. 
246 1964 Senate Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 65, at 35 (statement of Sen. Hruska). 
247 S. REP. NO. 89-66 (1965) at (individual views of Sen. Hruska) (noting that while the Amendment “leaves to Congress 
the determination of what, in light of the circumstances then existing, must be examined . . . the matter will be 
examined on the evidence available. It is desirable that the matter be examined with a sympathetic eye toward the 
President who, after all, is the choice of the electorate”) (emphasis added). 
248  Id. at 3. Note the difference in opinion between the committee report (interpreting the Amendment to give 
Congress a broad power to collect all necessary evidence), verses that of Senator Hruska (saying it only has the 
power to collect available evidence). 
249 See 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 140 (statement of Rep. Basil Whitener) (interpreting the 
proposed Amendment a “leav[ing] the Congress in position to . . . implement or do other things which may be 
necessary to carry out the amendment”). 
250 Id. at 143. 
251 Id. 
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attached to the President to make an objective judgment, Congress would have the power to 
send other medical experts to examine the President, by force if necessary.252 Thus, at least 
some of the Amendment’s framers plainly intended to give Congress the power to compel 
contemporary medical evidence from the President, based either on the substance of the 
Amendment alone or on Congress’ ability to pass legislation and amend its rules during the 21-
day period. 
 
1. HIPAA and Congressional Process 
Today, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)253 provides specific 
privacy protections for individual medical records. However, it is unlikely that the President 
could invoke HIPAA protections to prevent Congress from compelling him to undergo a 
medical examination. First, HIPAA is a statute, and most of its substantive protections and 
exceptions were enacted by regulation.254 As a result, Congress could pass legislation waiving 
any restriction for the purposes of carrying out its investigation.  And it would presumably not 
require a veto-proof majority to do so, since the Vice President would be Acting President 
exercising the power of the veto during this period. Attorney General Katzenbach anticipated 
this issue during hearings on the Amendment, speculating that Congress “might quite 
legislatively want medical examinations. You might even legislatively want those medical 
examinations, those opinions, before the Congress, before either House, before it acted.”255  
 
2. Executive Privilege 
More generally, presidents are usually exempt from congressional subpoenas under the 
constitutional doctrine of executive privilege. Thomas Jefferson wrote that, “To comply with 
such [congressional] calls would leave the nation without an executive branch, whose agency 
nevertheless is understood to be so constantly necessary that it is the sole branch which the 
constitution requires to be always in function.”256 Citing executive privilege, presidents have 
refused to comply with requests to testify before congressional committees.257  
  
However, executive privilege has been pierced on numerous occasions, and likely would be 
unavailing during an implementation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court 
famously addressed the scope of executive privilege in United States v. Nixon. The Court 
formally recognized the privilege, but found that Nixon’s blanket invocation of it would place 
an “impediment . . . in the way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do 
justice in criminal prosecutions [that] would plainly conflict with the function of the courts 
under Art[icle] III,” and that “the legitimate needs of the judicial process may outweigh 
                                               
252 Id. at 140. The discussion consisted of the following colloquy: Mr. Whitener: “Suppose the President says, ‘I am not 
going to have any doctor down here looking at me, I am President of the United States,’ then what happens?” . . . . Mr. 
Curtain: “Now, in those circumstances, somebody has to be able to go in and forcibly examine the President, and I 
think—” Mr. Whitener: “Forcibly?” Mr. Curtain: “I think this Commission should have the power to compel an 
examination, yes.” See also, id., at 144. While this conversation took place in the context of discussing the separate 
body Congress could set up to determine Presidential disability, it is safe to assume that the same powers and 
limitations discussed here would continue to apply during the 21-day period. 
253 Pub. L. 104-191 (1996). 
254 See generally 45 C.F.R. pt. 164. 
255 1965 Senate Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 21-22 (statement of Att’y Gen. Katzenbach). 
256 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George Hay (June 17, 1807), in 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 400, 401 (Paul 
Leicester Ford ed., 1905). 
257 See, Todd Garvey, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice, and Recent Developments, 
CONG. RES. SERV. (Dec. 15, 2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42670.pdf. 
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Presidential privilege.”258 It held that executive privilege did not shield President Nixon from 
compliance with the relevant subpoena because a “generalized assertion of privilege must yield 
to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.”259  
United States v. Nixon clearly indicates that 
executive privilege is not absolute. On the other 
hand, it does not directly determine the case of a 
president recalcitrant in the face of Congressional 
process in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment context: 
the subpoena at issue in Nixon was a judicial, rather 
than Congressional, subpoena. Lower court 
opinions, however, suggest that executive privilege 
would likely not prevent Congress from compelling 
the President to divulge information in service of an 
effort to implement the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  
Executive privilege is governed by a balancing test. The privilege has two components, each 
with different scope: the deliberative process privilege and the presidential communications 
privilege.260 The deliberative process privilege protects “advisory opinions, recommendations 
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies 
are formulated.”261 The balancing test for the deliberative process privilege is “more ad hoc” and 
includes factors like whether the government is a party to the litigation, and “the privilege 
disappears altogether when there is any reason to believe government misconduct 
occurred.”262  
The presidential communications privilege protects materials that reflect “presidential 
decision-making” and which the President believes should remain confidential; such materials 
are “presumptively privileged.” 263  The presidential communications privilege is generally 
considered “more difficult to surmount.” 264  However, even that “privilege is qualified, not 
absolute, and can be overcome by an adequate showing of need.”265  
Because compelling the President to be examined or otherwise provide certain evidence about 
his ability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency would be unlikely to implicate 
a need for confidentiality, it seems unlikely either component of the privilege would apply. This 
is especially true in the context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment process, where a showing of 
extraordinary necessity would apply to such information. (Additionally, as any compulsory 
process in service of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment would only take place when the President 
was relieved of his powers and duties, many of the rationales for protecting the President from 
258 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). 
259 Id. at 713. 
260 In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that executive privilege “extends to communications 
authored by or solicited and received by presidential advisers and that a specified demonstration of need must be 
made even in regard to a grand jury subpoena”). 
261  Id. at 737 (“Two requirements are essential to the deliberative process privilege: the material must be 
predecisional and it must be deliberative.”) (collecting cases). 
262 Id. at 746. 
263 Id. at 744. 
264 Id. at 746. 
265 Id. at 745. 
Executive privilege would likely 
not prevent Congress from 
compelling the President to 
divulge information in service 
of an effort to implement the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.   
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being forced to appear before Congress would not apply.) Nevertheless, we analyze below 
various instances in which executive privilege was asserted and adjudicated. 
 
In Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, the D.C. Circuit refused to 
enforce a subpoena on certain White House tapes.266 However, the Court based its decision 
largely on the finding that enforcing the subpoena would be “merely cumulative”—the House 
Judiciary Committee already had possession of the relevant tapes—and that, in contrast to the 
House Judiciary Committee, which was constitutionally tasked with judging impeachments, 
obtaining the tapes was insufficiently “critical to the performance of [the Select Committee’s] 
legislative functions.”267  
 
In 2007, President George W. Bush invoked executive privilege during a congressional 
investigation into the removal of nine United States Attorneys. The House Judiciary 
Committee challenged the privilege claims, and the D.C. district court held that senior 
presidential advisers do not enjoy absolute immunity from compelled testimony or production 
of documents pursuant to a congressional subpoena.268  
 
In 2012, President Obama invoked executive privilege in response to a subpoena from the House 
Oversight Committee seeking information from Attorney General Eric Holder regarding DOJ’s 
response to the committee’s investigation into Operation Fast and Furious. Similar to the U.S. 
Attorneys controversy, a civil suit was filed to compel the executive branch to comply with the 
committee subpoena. The D.C. district court ultimately held that while the subpoenaed 
documents were covered by the deliberative process component of executive privilege, the 
Department of Justice’s previous disclosure of many of the same documents waived its 
protections.269  
 
Finally, in Clinton v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a sitting President “is subject to 
judicial process in appropriate circumstances,” including court-ordered testimony in civil and 
criminal proceedings involving conduct that occurred when the defendant was not 
President. 270  Like United States v. Nixon, Clinton v. Jones dealt with judicial rather than 
congressional process. However, if a sitting active President may be subject to compulsory 
process from the judicial branch regarding a private civil matter based on his private conduct, 
it seems likely that a potentially disabled President would be similarly subject to compulsory 
process from Congress on a public matter as important as the implementation of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. 
 
The doctrine of executive privilege has not been tested in the context of compelling a President 
to appear before a Congressional hearing. But if the issue arose, its resolution would likely 
require a court’s intervention, as in the civil cases just discussed.  In the end, the President would 
most likely be deemed lawfully subject to a congressional subpoena issued in service of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment process. 
 
  
                                               
266 498 F.2d 725, 732 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
267 Id. at 731–32. 
268 Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). 
269 Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform v. Lynch, 156 F. Supp. 3d 101, 112–15 (D.D.C. 2016). 
270 520 U.S. 681, 704–705 (1997) (discussing long history of sitting presidents responding to judicial process to 
provide testimony in both civil and criminal proceedings). 
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3. Attorney-Client Privilege
A narrower category of evidence may give rise to a dispute about attorney-client privilege: 
communications between the President and White House attorneys. There is some 
disagreement as to whether and under what circumstances attorney-client privilege should 
apply to congressional proceedings. Two cases arguing for disclosure arose out of the 
Whitewater controversy.  
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, the Eighth Circuit held that the independent counsel 
may access the notes of White House attorneys related to the investigation.271 It argued that 
“the strong public interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials 
would be ill-served by recognition of a governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in 
criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public officials.”272  
Likewise, in In re Lindsay, the D.C. Circuit held that the independent counsel could compel grand 
jury testimony from a Deputy White House Counsel.273 It reasoned that “it would be contrary 
to tradition, common understanding, and our governmental system for the attorney-client 
privilege to attach to White House Counsel in the same manner as private counsel.”274 For 
similar reasons, the Seventh Circuit held that a state official could not invoke the privilege to 
prevent government counsel from testifying in a grand jury investigation.275  
On the other hand, the Second Circuit has held that a governor may invoke attorney-client 
privilege regarding his communications with government attorneys in connection with a 
criminal investigation.276 The Court reasoned that “if anything, the traditional rationale for the 
privilege applies with special force in the government context.”277  
It is worth noting that each of these cases was decided in the context of a criminal, rather than 
legislative, investigation. Additionally, the courts that have ruled in favor of disclosure seem to 
have been significantly preoccupied with the government lawyer’s second, higher duty to the 
public interest, especially when the privilege would prevent the revelation of official 
misconduct.278 
271 112 F.3d 910, 921 (8th Cir. 1997). 
272 Id.  
273 158 F.3d 1263, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam). 
274 Id. The Court also noted, however, that the privilege attaches to the President’s communications to his private 
counsel to the same extent as any other person, and that a government lawyer could under some circumstances be 
covered by the privilege where that attorney acted merely as an intermediary with the President’s private counsel. 
Id. at 1279. 
275 In re Witness Before Special Grand Jury 2000-2 (Ryan), 288 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 2002) (Wood, J.) (noting that 
“the privilege with which we are concerned today runs to the office, not to the employees in that office. . . . a 
government attorney should have no privilege to shield relevant information from the public citizens to whom she 
owes ultimate allegiance, as represented by the grand jury.”). 
276 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005). 
277 Id. at 534. 
278 See Ryan, 288 F.3d at 293 (noting that unlike private counsel, “government lawyers have a higher, competing duty 
to act in the public interest” and that “[i]t would be both unseemly and a misuse of public assets to permit a public 
official to use a taxpayer-provided attorney to conceal from the taxpayers themselves otherwise admissible 
evidence of financial wrongdoing, official misconduct, or abuse of power”); Lindsey, 158 F.3d at 1273 (“This view of 
the proper allegiance of the government lawyer is complemented by the public's interest in uncovering illegality 
among its elected and appointed officials.”); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 112 F.3d at 921 (“We believe the strong public 
interest in honest government and in exposing wrongdoing by public officials would be ill-served by recognition of a 
governmental attorney-client privilege applicable in criminal proceedings inquiring into the actions of public 
officials.”).  
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We think that a court would generally be reticent to compel the disclosure of material 
otherwise covered by attorney-client privilege. However, if there is a demonstrated level of 
compelling need for the material or it would potentially reveal misconduct or criminal activity, 
a court could well find that material to be unprivileged.279   
F. How may the President make the case for his or her ability to serve?
The President possesses a number of avenues for stating his or her ability to serve: First, the 
President may, broadly speaking, comply with all of Congress’s requests during its deliberation. 
Second, the President will almost certainly strive to influence public opinion outside of these 
formal proceedings. This might take the form of speeches, pronouncements, interviews, the 
release of information pertaining to his health, and other public statements from those close to 
him who could attest to his ability.280 Third, in theory, the President could even appear before 
Congress,281 although Congress, not the President, would control the formal proceedings, and 
the President’s influence over the proceedings would be limited.  
President Clinton’s impeachment trial provides a useful analogy for how the President might 
resist a Section 4 determination. The Clinton White House largely complied with the Senate 
process while seeking to use every tool at its disposal—including its allies in Congress—to 
defend the President.282  However, as noted in Part III.D of this Reader’s Guide, we believe that 
the Department of Justice and the White House Counsel should serve the Acting President, 
rather than the President, during this period. 
G. Would frustrating this congressional process constitute an impeachable
offense?
Depending on the circumstances, frustrating the Twenty-Fifth Amendment process could 
constitute an impeachable offense. In the words of Professor Tribe, impeachable “high crimes 
and misdemeanors” “constitute major offenses against our very system of government, or 
serious abuses of the governmental power with which a public official has been entrusted (as 
in the case of a public official who accepts a bribe in order to turn his official powers to personal 
or otherwise corrupt ends), or grave wrongs in pursuit of governmental power.”283 Thus, if a 
President were to interfere with the congressional proceedings through abuse of authority or 
some other official misconduct, Congress could use those actions as a basis for impeachment 
proceedings.   
279 Cf. Fordham University School of Law Second Clinic on Presidential Succession, supra note 29, at 983 (“Based on 
the sparse precedent, a court is unlikely to override attorney-client privilege in a Section 4 proceeding absent an 
extremely high showing of need.”) 
280 See Bayh, supra note 115, at 20. 
281 See 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 145 (statement of Rep. Willard S. Curtin) (saying he would 
“certainly . . . have no objection to the President being heard . . . under those circumstances,” and while there is no 
requirement that he speak, assuming that “he certainly would not stand mute during this whole proceeding unless 
he was in real bad shape”). 
282  For a full account of White House activities during this period, see PETER BAKER, THE BREACH: INSIDE THE 
IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON (2000). 
283 See Laurence H. Tribe, Defining ‘High Crimes and Misdemeanors’: Basic Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712, 718 
(1999). The misconduct would have to be of a serious nature. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 90 (1973) (concluding that the Constitution does not contemplate “resort[ing] to 
impeachment of the President for petty misconduct.”) 
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VI. Judicial Review of a Determination of Inability
The political question doctrine likely precludes any judicial review of the Vice President, 
Principal Officers, and Congress’s substantive determination of presidential inability under 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. As with other situations in which the political 
question doctrine applies, Section 4 contains a “textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department.”284  
Although it is highly unlikely that any court 
would do so, there are doctrinal avenues 
available for a court to adjudicate the merits of 
certain procedural challenges to an invocation of 
Section 4. Although the Court invoked the 
political question doctrine in Nixon v. United 
States in declining to evaluate the Senate’s 
procedure for convicting an impeached federal 
judge,285 that reasoning might not apply in the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment context. The 
legislative history of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment also gives some indication that the 
framers of that Amendment contemplated that 
a court might one day need to interpret at least 
some of its procedural requirements. For prudential reasons, we think it highly unlikely that a 
court would get involved absent a patent and material departure from the amendment’s clear 
procedures. But the political question doctrine in its current form does not altogether foreclose 
such review. 
A. Is judicial review available for the substantive determination of
presidential inability?
No. The Amendment’s text strongly suggests that the determination of presidential inability is 
a political question, committed to the political branches.  
The modern political question doctrine has its origins in Justice Brennan’s plurality opinion in 
Baker v. Carr. In that case, the Court held that the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over 
challenges to legislative apportionment and that such questions were not non-justiciable 
“political questions.” According to the plurality, the political question doctrine is “essentially a 
function of the separation of powers,” and is triggered by:  
“a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy 
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a 
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of the government; or an unusual need for 
284 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
285 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
For prudential reasons, we think 
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unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality 
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments 
on one question.”286 
The recent decision in Zivotofsky v. Clinton arguably narrows the Baker test to the first two, 
textual factors (as opposed to the last four, prudential factors).287 Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment clearly commits the initial determination of presidential inability to political 
actors: “the Vice President and a Majority of either the principal officers of the executive 
departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide.” 288  Moreover, the 
Amendment contains a built-in mechanism for appeal that excludes the judicial branch. If there 
is disagreement between the President on one hand, and the Vice President and a majority of 
either the Principal Officers or “such other body as Congress may by law provide” on the other, 
then “Congress shall decide the issue.”289 Congress, not the judiciary, is to be the ultimate arbiter 
of presidential inability.  
Moreover, under the second Baker prong, the issue of presidential inability lacks “judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”290 As the court later noted in Nixon v. 
United States, “the concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is 
not completely separable from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable 
standards for resolving it; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the 
conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch.”291 As 
discussed above in Part II of this report, the framers of the Amendment purposefully avoided 
providing a precise substantive definition of inability, and the text of the Amendment provides 
no guidance on that issue.292 On its face, the question whether the President is or is not “unable 
to discharge the powers and duties of his office” appears to be a political determination, and 
not a judicially manageable standard. . Thus, a judicial challenge to invocation or operation of 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could well be dismissed even under the Zivotofsky Court’s 
recently narrowed “textual factors” test for determining political questions.  
The history of the Amendment’s enactment and public statements by its principal drafters also 
suggest that the determination of inability was meant to be a political question. For instance, in 
a colloquy with Senator Kennedy on the definition of inability, Senator Bayh readily admitted 
that the Amendment provided “leeway with respect to Congress and the committees and the 
Cabinet.”293 When Senator Kennedy raised the concern that the Principal Officers might exploit 
the flexible inability standard to remove a President pretextually because of political 
disagreement, Senator Bayh countered that the absence of a mechanism to declare a President 
unable posed “considerably more” danger than did the flexible standard.294 That one of the 
286 Id. (emphasis added). 
287 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012); see also id. at 204-06 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (defending the 
importance of prudential factors); Rachel Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 267 (2002) (describing judicial narrowing of the 
prudential political question doctrine). 
288 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
289 Id. 
290 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. 
291 506 U.S. at 228-29. 
292 See supra Part II. 
293 111 CONG. REC. 15,381 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
294  Id.; see also Birch Bayh, The White House Safety Net, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1995), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/08/opinion/the-white-house-safety-net.html (“as Dwight D. Eisenhower said, 
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Amendment’s key framers defended the flexible inability standard strongly suggests that 
drafters sought to provide great discretion to the political process.  
The larger historical context similarly suggests that inability is a political question. The drafters 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sought to solve ambiguities in the Constitution’s existing 
inability provision, Article II, Section 1, Clause 5. Article II did not clearly establish “who has the 
authority to determine what inability is, when it commences, and when it terminates.”295 The 
drafters of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment provided a clear answer to these questions: the 
determination is made by the Vice President acting in concert with the Principal Officers (or 
such other body as Congress may provide), with Congress being the ultimate arbiter. To 
unsettle this textually clear delegation of authority by inserting the judiciary into the process 
would significantly undermine Congress’s goal of remedying this uncertainty. 
Finally, the political realities of presidential succession—including “an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made”—make it unlikely that a court 
would intervene. 296  In a floor colloquy immediately preceding the Senate vote on the 
Amendment, Senator Albert Gore, Sr. of Tennessee predicted that “it is entirely conceivable 
that while the courts are in the process of making a final determination there might be two 
individuals claiming the power of the Presidency.”297 Such a state of affairs would clearly run 
counter to the Amendment’s purpose of avoiding “the catastrophe of disputed succession or 
the chaos of uncertain command.”298 As a purely prudential matter, the lower courts and the 
Supreme Court would likely be hesitant to enter a deeply fraught political and constitutional 
controversy over which the judges would have little competency and control.299 
B. Is judicial review available for procedural challenges to the determination
of inability?
Perhaps yes, but only if limited to certain procedural requirements clearly specified in the text 
of the Amendment itself—and, even then, a court would likely refrain from exercising 
jurisdiction.  
the ‘determination of Presidential disability is really a political question.’ The Vice President and Cabinet are uniquely 
able to determine when it is in the nation’s best interests for the Vice President to take the reins”). It was President 
Eisenhower’s disability that helped make clear the need for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment when he suffered a minor 
stroke while in office. Jeffrey Rosen, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment Makes Presidential Disability a Political Question, 
THE ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/presidential-disability-is-a-
political-question/527703/. 
295 S. REP.  NO. 88-1382, at 11 (1964). 
296 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). 
297 111 CONG. REC. 15,588 (1965) (statement of Sen. Gore). 
298 Letter from President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Congress of the United States (Jan. 28, 1965), reprinted in SELECTED 
MATERIALS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, S. DOC. NO. 93-42, at 114 (1973); see also 1964 Senate Subcomm. 
Hearings, supra note 65 at 85 (statement of Walter Craig, President of the American Bar Association) 
(“Congressional leaders, constitutional scholars, and many others are in complete agreement that something must 
be done to eliminate the possibility of chaos in the event of the President’s disability.”). 
299 See generally Jesse H. Choper, Why the Supreme Court Should Not Have Decided the Presidential Election of 2000, 
18 CONST. COMMENT 335 (2001) (arguing that the Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore was unnecessary and threatened to 
diminish public trust and confidence in the Court as well as its institutional standing and overall effectiveness); 
Herbert M. Kritzer, The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court, 85 
JUDICATURE 32 (2001) (describing the effects of the controversial decision in Bush v. Gore on public perceptions of 
the Supreme Court’s legitimacy as modest, but measurable);  but see BERGER, supra note 283, at 119 (“I would urge 
that judicial review of impeachment is required to protect the other branches from Congress’ arbitrary will.”). 
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The history of the drafting suggests that some framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment did 
intend for courts to interpret the provision. In floor debates immediately before the 
Amendment’s passage, Senator Gore expressed concern that “the Court might someday of 
necessity have to rule upon” certain ambiguous provisions of the Amendment.300 Specifically, 
Senator Gore found it ambiguous whether Congress’s creation of an “other body” would 
necessarily eliminate the Principal Officers from the equation.301 In other words, according to 
Senator Gore, the Supreme Court might one day face a situation in which it would need to 
decide whether the Principal Officers or “such other body” should prevail if their views of the 
president’s inability conflicted. 
Senator Bayh, the principal drafter and proponent of the Amendment, engaged with Senator 
Gore’s concerns directly, pointing to judicial interpretations of Article V as “evidence about 
what the courts have indicated in this respect.”302 Senator Bayh went on to note that, in case 
there should be any ambiguity, the Court would look to legislative intent and “[a]s a result of 
the insight and the perseverance of the Senator [Gore] from Tennessee, we have now written 
a record of legislative intent . . . .”303 Senator Bayh’s statements seemed to assume that a court 
called upon to interpret the procedures prescribed by the Amendment would reach the merits 
of the question. 
In this extended colloquy over whether the language of the amendment was sufficiently clear 
to allow for definitive judicial interpretation, only Senator Ervin directly raised the justiciability 
question. Ervin, a proponent of the bill, disagreed with Senator Gore’s prediction that 
uncertainty on that point might lead to a “court contest.”304 Ervin noted that “[i]n [his] view [the 
question of whether or not the President is capable of performing the duties of his office] would 
be a political question and for that reason the Court would not be called upon to pass upon 
it.”305 
In 1988, the Miller Center Commission on Presidential Disability and the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, which included Senator Bayh, noted in its final report that “the chief justice and 
other members of the Supreme Court should have no role in any such body or in any other 
fashion under the terms of the 25th Amendment” because “in a situation perhaps now 
unimaginable, the Supreme Court might be called to rule on some application of the [Twenty-
Fifth] Amendment.”306 That is, the Commission foresaw that the justices might one day have to 
300 111 CONG. REC. 15,588 (1965) (statement of Sen. Gore). 
301 Id. 
302 Id. at 15,593 (statement of Sen. Bayh). Senator Bayh saw, in the constitutional amendment process prescribed in 
Article V, an analogy to Senator Gore’s objection to the proposed Amendment in that Article V also offers a choice 
between two procedures. Id. at 15,594 (“In dealing with the fifth article, courts have held in those cases to which I 
have referred—which are as close to being on the point as any I have been able to find—that Congress has full and 
plenary power to decide which method should be used, and once the choice is made, the other method is precluded.”). 
303 Id. at 15,594 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
304 Id. at 15,589 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (“I do not understand how there would be a court contest, because the 
amendment provides that the Vice President, acting with either the Cabinet or another body established by 
Congress, would raise the question.”) Senator Ervin seemed to view Congress as the ultimate arbiter of presidential 
inability. Id. (“They [the Vice President and either the Cabinet or another body established by Congress] would make 
a temporary decision, and that temporary decision would be immediately transmitted to the Congress for its 
decision. . . . Congress would decide the question before it would ever reach the courts.”). 
305 Id. at 15,588 (statement of Sen. Ervin). It should also be noted that Senator Gore was one of only five senators to 
vote against the amendment, while Senator Ervin was one of its supporters. Id. at 15,596 (giving the results of the 
Senate vote on the amendment). 
306 Miller Center Comm’n No. 4, supra note 23, at 13. 
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rule on the application of the Amendment, and for that reason, they should not serve on the 
“other body” because this would produce a conflict. This position was held by Chief Justice 
Warren during the congressional deliberations on the Amendment, and was reiterated by Chief 
Justice Burger in speaking to the Miller Center Commission.307 
 
Other legislative history of the Amendment indicates that certain challenges to its 
implementation would not be justiciable. An earlier version of the Amendment provided that 
Congress would “immediately” decide the issue of presidential inability.308 In a hearing on that 
early draft, Senator Hruska expressed concern that this vague language would allow Congress 
to delay its determination.309 More specifically, Senator Hruska wondered whether Congress 
may legislatively define the word “immediately” to mean a specific time frame, and whether the 
Supreme Court would approve of such a definition.310 In response to Sen. Hruska’s questioning, 
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach opined that “in probability, the Supreme Court would 
accept any judgment Congress made on that.” 311  More to the point, the Attorney General 
“[found] it difficult to find any context in which this would go before the Supreme Court, and I 
expect they would defer to any judgment the Congress made.”312 
 
Nor does the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. United States necessarily foreclose all judicial 
review. Indeed, it suggests that a narrow range of Twenty-Fifth Amendment questions—those 
involving matters of procedure—might potentially be justiciable. In Nixon, a federal judge who 
had been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate challenged his conviction on 
what were essentially procedural grounds. 313  Pursuant to Senate Rule XI, a committee of 
Senators heard the evidence against Judge Nixon and reported that evidence to the full Senate, 
which then voted to impeach him. Judge Nixon contended that the procedure violated the 
Impeachment Trial Clause, which provides that the “Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.”314 The judge argued that “Senate Rule XI violates the constitutional grant of 
authority to the Senate to ‘try’ all impeachments because it prohibits the whole Senate from 
taking part in the evidentiary hearings.”315  
 
The Court held that “the word ‘try’ in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an 
identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate,” and that Nixon’s 
claim was thus non-justiciable.” 316  The Nixon Court’s textual and structural argument 
proceeded from two main observations: (1) the Impeachment Trial Clause “is a grant of 
authority to the Senate, and the word ‘sole’ indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate 
and nowhere else,”317  and (2) “[t]he next two sentences specify requirements to which the 
Senate proceedings shall conform: The Senate shall be on oath or affirmation, a two-thirds vote 
is required to convict, and when the President is tried the Chief Justice shall preside.”318  
 
                                               
307 Id. 
308 S.J. Res. 1, 89th Cong. § 5 (1965). 
309 1965 Senate Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 21 (statement of Sen. Hruska). 
310 Id. at 22. 
311 Id. (statement of Att’y Gen. Katzenbach). 
312 Id. 
313 506 U.S. 224 (1993). 
314 U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 6. 
315 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228. 
316 Id. at 238. 
317 Id. at 229 
318 Id. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, rejected Nixon’s argument that the word “try” 
in the first sentence imposed the additional procedural requirement that the proceedings must 
be “in the nature of a judicial trial.”319 On a textual level, the Chief Justice pointed out that there 
were various definitions of the word “try,” both in contemporary usage and at the time of the 
founding, and concluded that the word “lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially 
manageable standard of review.”320 This position was “fortified by the existence of three very 
specific requirements that the Constitution does impose on the Senate when trying 
impeachments.”321 The “precision” of these requirements “suggests that the Framers did not 
intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings by the use of the 
word ‘try’ in the first sentence.”322  
Thus, on the face of its holding, Nixon would appear to indicate that any dispute about the 
internal procedures Congress, or the Vice President and either the Principal Officers or the 
“other body,” use to determine whether a President is disabled would be a nonjusticiable 
political question.  
However, the Nixon Court did not directly address the question whether it might rule on 
questions pertaining to the other “very specific requirements” that might provide “an 
identifiable textual limit on the authority which is committed to the Senate:” 323 for example, 
whether a court might overturn a conviction that was done (1) without a two-thirds vote, or (2) 
without the Senate being “on oath or affirmation.” In comparison to the Impeachment Trial 
Clause, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment lays out an even more detailed procedure, with more 
“specific requirements” and “identifiable textual limits on the authority.” As a result, a court 
confronted with a suit related to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might be tempted to pass on 
similar, textually delineated and limited procedural questions.  
But if a court passes on the merits of a procedural question in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
context, the court would quickly run up against another problem: it likely will be unable to 
provide an effective, immediate remedy. The Nixon Court noted that “the lack of finality and 
the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability.”324 The Chief Justice expressed 
agreement with the Court of Appeals that “opening the door of judicial review to the 
procedures used by the Senate in trying impeachments would ‘expose the political life of the 
country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.”325  
A judicial challenge to the implementation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment poses an even 
greater risk of “constitutional chaos.” As one contemporary observer noted, one of the principal 
arguments for a constitutional amendment on presidential inability, as opposed to a legislative 
solution, was a consensus based on “a fundamental policy understanding that delay by 
challenge in the courts or elsewhere would shatter the continuity of executive leadership and 
thereby endanger the nation.”326 In order to avoid such a challenge, “[t]he procedures, it was 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at 230. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. at 238. 
324 Id. at 236. 
325 Id. 
326 Richard P. Longaker, Presidential Continuity: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 13 UCLA L. REV. 532, 545 (1966). 
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finally concluded, were to be enumerated as distinctly as possible in an amendment to the 
Constitution.”327  
Judicial involvement in the interpretation of the 
Amendment’s procedural requirements, no less than 
judicial review of a determination of inability, would 
arguably also run counter to the purpose and goals of 
the Amendment—namely, to ensure continuity in the 
executive branch. It would also run counter to the goal 
of ensuring a swift resolution of inability issues—a goal 
apparent from the Amendment’s strict timing 
requirements providing Congress only twenty-one 
days to make a determination of Presidential 
inability. 328  In short, although judicial review is not 
entirely foreclosed by current doctrine, we believe that 
prudential considerations make it highly unlikely that a 
court would undertake judicial review of the 
procedural elements of any invocation of the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment. 
In conclusion, a challenge related to “very specific requirements” of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment procedure that provide “an identifiable textual limit on the authority which is 
committed to” the relevant political branches may be justiciable.329  However, the scope of 
justiciable challenges to Twenty-Fifth Amendment procedures would likely be very narrow, and 
in practice, the judicial branch would be unlikely to intervene absent patent and material 
departures from the expressly prescribed textual procedures. 
VII. The Morning(s) After a Congressional Determination Regarding
Inability
A. Once Congress has declared that an inability exists, can a President
previously determined to have an inability become President again?
Yes. A president previously determined under Section 4 to have an inability may become 
president again. Discussing an earlier version of the Amendment, Attorney General Katzenbach 
testified to the House that if the President and the Vice President (as the Acting President) 
agree that the President is no longer disabled, the President can immediately resume the 
powers and duties of the office.330 This view was echoed by (among others) former Attorney 
327 Id. 
328 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
329 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238. 
330 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 99-100 (discussing an earlier draft of the Amendment and stating 
that “even where the President’s inability was established originally pursuant to section 4, rather than declared 
voluntarily by him, the President could resume the powers and duties of his office immediately with the concurrence 
of the Acting President . . . . I think the language will bear that instruction that he doesn’t have to wait if the Vice 
President immediately agrees with him.”) Though the Attorney General was speaking in the context of a situation 
where the Vice President concurred with the President that the latter was no longer disabled before Congress 
Judicial involvement in the 
interpretation of the 
Amendment’s procedural 
requirements, no less than 
judicial review of a 
determination of inability, 
would arguably also run 
counter to the purpose and 
goals of the Amendment—
namely, to ensure continuity 
in the executive branch. 
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General Herbert Brownell, Chairman of the American Bar Association’s Special Committee on 
Presidential Inability and Vice Presidential Vacancy.331 
B. Once Congress has determined that an inability exists, can the President
resubmit his declaration of no inability at a later date?
After Congress has determined that an inability exists, the President may again submit his 
declaration of no inability at a later date. The text of the Amendment is silent on whether the 
President may resubmit his transmittal of no inability once Congress has determined that an 
inability exists. However, the legislative history strongly suggests that, in the event Congress 
chooses not to reinstate the President, the President can repeat the Section 4 process again at 
a later date. According to Senator Bayh’s testimony in front of the House: 
It is my impression or intent that [the President] would have more than one 
chance [to convince Congress that he is not disabled] but, having utilized the one 
chance, I think he would be very careful in making a second appeal to the 
Congress because the degree of frequency with which he appealed to Congress 
would certainly reflect the attitude with which Congress would look on his 
mental capacity.332 
Similarly, before ratification, Attorney General Katzenbach testified that he, too, interpreted 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to permit the President to repeat the Section 4 process.333  
C. If the Section 4 process is triggered but does not conclude with transfer of
the President’s powers and duties to the Vice President, may it be employed
again later against the same President?
As a legal matter, yes. The Amendment’s text nowhere suggests that the Section 4 process 
could not be triggered more than once with respect to the same President. However, as 
discussed below, the President can fire department heads who unsuccessfully trigger the 
Section 4 process, and Congress can impeach the Vice President for wrongfully declaring a 
presidential inability. In practice, therefore, it seems unlikely that Section 4 would be triggered 
more than once by the same collection of individuals against the same President.  
D. If the Section 4 process concludes with the Vice President as Acting
President, does that Vice President assume the Office of the Presidency?
No. The Vice President does not assume the office of the presidency when he assumes the 
powers and duties of the office under Section 4. However, as discussed in detail in Part IV of this 
decided the issue, we believe that the same logic would hold even after Congress determined that the President was 
disabled; namely, that he could return to office if he and the Acting President determined he was again fit to carry 
out the powers and duties of the presidency. 
331 Id. at 243 (“Of course, if it was agreed upon by the President and the Vice President, it could take effect at any 
earlier time specified therein.”); FEERICK, supra note 9, at 120; see also Adam R.F. Gustafson, Presidential Inability and 
Subjective Meaning, 27 YALE L. POL’Y REV. 459, 475 (2009) (collecting more sources of legislative history supporting 
this view). 
332 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 94 (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
333 Id. at 101 (“[T]he only other possible interpretation would be that having been done once, [the President] can never 
can get back in [via the Section 4 process], and I would not think that was the intention.”). For a similar analysis of 
both Bayh and Katzenbach’s statements, see Gustafson, supra note 331, at 468. 
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Reader’s Guide the Acting President exercises all of the authority of the presidency as a purely 
legal matter. It is for that reason that Section 1 of the Twenty Fifth Amendment clarifies those 
circumstances under which the Vice President actually “becomes” the President, providing: “In 
case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President 
shall become President.”  
None of these three Section 1 circumstances encompasses the Vice President declaring a 
President disabled under Section 4. When Section 4 is triggered, the President does not die or 
resign his office; he simply ceases to exercise the attendant powers and duties. And while it 
might appear that the President is de facto removed from office when he is declared disabled, 
Section 4 does not refer to removal, and other portions of the Constitution use the term 
specifically in reference to impeachment. These facts strongly imply that the word “removal” in 
Section 1 similarly refers to situations in which the President is impeached, not merely separated 
from his powers and duties for reason of inability.  
The legislative history of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment confirms that the Acting President 
does not occupy the “office” of the presidency, though he performs all of the “powers and 
duties” of the office. As a practical matter, this distinction will have little effect on the Acting 
President’s legal authority. But as Part IV explains there is an important symbolic difference—
and a perceived difference in legitimacy—between an Acting President and a President. In an 
exchange during Senator Bayh’s House testimony, Congressman Poff noted that:  
I am not sure we want him [the Vice President] to have any title to the powers 
and duties. Speaking for myself, I am jealous of the powers and duties for the sake 
of the President who has been elected by the people. I want the Vice President to 
have only the right to discharge the powers and duties. I say the distinction may 
be a small one, but I think it is important in dramatizing our first concern for the 
protection of the duties and powers of the President.334 
Senator Bayh responded by noting that the Vice President does “not have the office of President 
but that of Acting President. He does not get the full powers and duties of the office of 
President unabated. He is Acting President.”335  
Setting this symbolic distinction aside, the Acting President would be constitutionally 
empowered to conduct the same acts as the President. In the floor debate in the Senate, for 
instance, Senator Bayh expressed his belief that the Vice President acting as President would 
be able to fire and appoint cabinet officials. When Senator Hart expressed concern that a Vice 
President acting as President would remove cabinet members to “consolidate[] his position” as 
Acting President, Senator Bayh admitted that this concern was legitimate, but declared, “we do 
not want a Vice President who is acting in good cause, say, for example, in a 3-year term of office, 
being unable to reappoint Cabinet members who may have died or resigned.”336  
334 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 65 (emphasis added). 
335 Id.; see also id. at 196 (statement of Martin Taylor, Chairman, Comm. on Fed. Constitution, N.Y. State Bar Ass’n) (“It 
is the power and duties that are taken over, not the office.”); FEERICK, supra note 9, at 112 (“This Section [3] is designed 
to make clear that in a case of presidential inability the Vice President simply discharges the powers and duties of 
the presidency; he assumes neither the office nor the title of President. Rather, he remains the Vice President, 
exercising presidential power, under the title of Acting President.”). 
336 111 CONG. REC. 3284 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). 
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For a fuller discussion of the Acting President’s legal powers and the practical political limits on 
those powers, see Part IV of this Reader’s Guide. 
E. Can the President be impeached after the Section 4 process concludes?
Yes. The President may be impeached after the conclusion of the Section 4 process. Given that, 
as discussed above, the President remains in office even if Congress determines that a 
presidential inability exists, a disabled President could still be subject to “remov[al] from Office 
on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.”337  
F. May the Acting President appoint a new Vice President?
No. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not permit the Acting President to appoint a new Vice 
President. Under Section 2, “[w]henever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,” 
the President may appoint a Vice President, with the consent of a majority of both houses of 
Congress. However, the Vice President’s assumption of the powers and duties as Acting 
President does not create such a “vacancy” in the office of the Vice President.  
The final version included the word “vacancy” in Section 2,338 did not intend to change the 
Amendment’s substance and only sought to “simplify the language or bring it into harmony 
with other provisions of the Constitution.”339  
This definition of vacancy was confirmed during Senator Bayh’s testimony in front of the House, 
during which he unequivocally agreed with Representative Poff’s definition of “vacancy” as 
occurring only when the “Vice President is no longer occupying the office by reason of death, 
resignation, or removal.”340 In the course of their exchange, neither legislator mentioned that a 
Vice President becoming Acting President creates a vacancy in the office of the Vice President. 
On the floor of the Senate, Senator Bayh also maintained that the Acting President would have 
no ability to appoint either a new Vice President or an Acting Vice President.341  
337  Commentators have noted impeachment and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment are different, complementary 
processes. See BERGER, supra note 283, at 181-82 (concluding that the President may not be impeached on account of 
illness or disability, and that the proper recourse in such circumstances is through the Twenty-Fifth Amendment).  
338 See generally Feerick, supra note 3, 1093–94 (2017). One enduring gap in the Amendment is its failure to provide 
for a situation where both the President and the Vice President are disabled, or the vice presidency is vacant. See id.; 
Akhil Reed Amar, Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 20 (2010). In those 
situations, “the [Twenty-Fifth] Amendment’s elaborate machinery for determining presidential disability will seize 
up.” Id. at 20. 
339 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 74. 
340 1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 87.  
341 111 CONG. REC. 3253 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). As a structural matter, permitting the Acting President to 
appoint a new Vice President could potentially lead to the constitutionally bizarre scenario where two people 
simultaneously occupied the office of the Vice Presidency. This would occur if (1) an Acting President appoints a Vice 
President with Congress’s consent; (2) the President resumes the powers and duties of his office at a later date; thus 
(3) returning the once Acting President to his status as the mere Vice President; while also (4) leaving the newly 
appointed Vice President in office. In part to avoid such confusion, Dean Feerick similarly concludes that “[t]he
legislative history is clear that an ‘inability’ of the President resulting in the Vice President’s having to act as President 
is not a situation involving a vacancy in the vice presidency.” FEERICK, supra note 9,  at 109.
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Finally, it is worth noting two potential gaps that could arise from the fact that the Amendment 
does not provide the Acting President the capacity to appoint a new Vice President: If (1) 
Congress declares the President unable and (2) the Vice President subsequently leaves office, 
through death, resignation or removal, the unable President cannot appoint a new Vice 
President to become Acting President. In such a “dual vacancy” scenario, a statute passed 
pursuant to Congress’s authority under the Succession Clause empowers a chain of officers 
beginning with the Speaker of the House to “act as President.”342 The second potential gap 
would occur if the President were disabled and, either simultaneously or subsequently, the Vice 
President became disabled, as well. No constitutional or statutory mechanism currently exists 
for declaring the Vice President unable and ensuring succession under such circumstances.343  
G. Can the President remove cabinet officers for their participation in the 25th
Amendment process?
Yes. It is possible that, should the Vice President and a majority of the Principal Officers trigger 
Section 4 but fail to secure the necessary vote of Congress to sustain their declaration of 
presidential inability, the President could fire members of the cabinet and/or the two Houses of 
Congress could act to impeach the participants for their activities.  
As a background matter, the Supreme Court has held that the President possesses broad 
constitutional authority to fire Principal Officers, such as cabinet-level officials, at will.344 On its 
face, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment does not modify this presidential authority, which was well 
established at the time of the adoption of the Twenty Fifth Amendment. 
According to Dean Feerick, the legislative history “is replete with suggestions that irresponsible 
behavior [with regard to Section 4] also might subject a Vice President to impeachment.”345 For 
instance, answering questions on the floor of the Senate, Senator Bayh responded to concerns 
that a Vice President might “usurp the office” of the Presidency by noting that, should he do so, 
the Vice President’s “political future would be ruined.”346 In his testimony to the House, Senator 
Bayh concluded that Congress could impeach a Vice President for abusing the Section 4 
process, though he also suggested that this possibility was slim. Instead, Senator Bayh hoped, 
“the great weight of public opinion would compel the Vice President to act judicially.” 347 
342 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2012). But see Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law 
Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995) (arguing that the current presidential succession statute is 
unconstitutional because neither the Speaker of the House nor the President pro-tempore of the Senate, second 
and third in line for the presidency, are “Officer[s]” as required by the Succession Clause). 
343 See Roy E. Brownell II, What to Do if Simultaneous Presidential and Vice-Presidential Inability Struck Today, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1027 (2017). 
344 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) (“Since 1789, the Constitution 
has been understood to empower the President to keep these officers accountable—by removing them from office, 
if necessary.”). In some circumstances, Congress may limit the President’s power to remove principal officers. See, 
e.g., Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding a statute prohibiting the removal of an
FTC commissioner, except for good cause); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (same, but for member of the
War Claims Commission); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (same, but for independent counsel). However,
Congress has not provided that protection to the heads of the executive departments. And, even if Congress did
provide such a protection at a future date, a court would likely find that protection unconstitutionally “interfere[s]
with the President’s exercise of the ‘executive power.’” Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690. 
345 FEERICK, supra note 9, at 121.
346 111 CONG. REC. 3284 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
347  1965 House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 13, at 88. However, immediately after Senator Bayh’s comment,
Representative Mathias noted that “I would feel that the use of impeachment proceedings where there is a
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Taken as a whole, the fact that Congress anticipated the possibility that the department heads 
and the Vice President would be subject to political pressure when deciding whether to invoke 
Section 4 strongly indicates that the President could politically retaliate against department 
heads who he thinks have abused the Section 4 process to seek his removal from office. 
CONCLU SI ON  
This Reader’s Guide provides a detailed examination of many important, but never definitively 
answered questions, surrounding the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Over the course of half a 
century, Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been triggered, and other parts 
of the Amendment have been only sparingly invoked.  
Were the issue of presidential inability to be contested among the sitting President and other 
political actors, faithful adherence to the rule of law would require careful parsing of and 
conscientious adherence to the text, legislative history, structural considerations, and practice 
of the Amendment. Even—perhaps especially—in a time of constitutional crisis, we hope that 
this Reader’s Guide could serve as a helpful road map to ensure that the Amendment is properly 
implemented in accordance with the rule of law.  
subjective question of the President's health or tin President's physical abilities would be inappropriate. It wouldn’t 
fall within high crimes or misdemeanors.” Id. at 89. 
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AP P ENDIX  
 
A. Section 3 Letters 
 
Ronald Reagan: Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of 
the House on the Discharge of the President's Powers and Duties During His 
Surgery (July 13, 1985) 
 
Dear Mr. President: (Dear Mr. Speaker:) 
 
I am about to undergo surgery during which time I will be briefly and temporarily incapable 
of discharging the Constitutional powers and duties of the Office of the President of the 
United States. 
 
After consultation with my Counsel and the Attorney General, I am mindful of the 
provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution and of the 
uncertainties of its application to such brief and temporary periods of incapacity. I do not 
believe that the drafters of this Amendment intended its application to situations such as 
the instant one. 
 
Nevertheless, consistent with my longstanding arrangement with Vice President George 
Bush, and not intending to set a precedent binding anyone privileged to hold this Office in 
the future, I have determined and it is my intention and direction that Vice President George 
Bush shall discharge those powers and duties in my stead commencing with the 
administration of anesthesia to me in this instance. 
 
I shall advise you and the Vice President when I determine that I am able to resume the 
discharge of the Constitutional powers and duties of this Office. 
 
May God bless this Nation and us all. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
RONALD REAGAN 
 
Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=38883  
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George W. Bush: Letter to Congressional Leaders on Temporary Transfer of the Powers 
and Duties of President of the United States (June 29, 2002) 
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) 
As my staff has previously communicated to you, I will undergo this morning a routine 
medical procedure requiring sedation. In view of present circumstances, I have determined 
to transfer temporarily my Constitutional powers and duties to the Vice President during 
the brief period of the procedure and recovery. 
Accordingly, in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute my written 
declaration that I am unable to discharge the Constitutional powers and duties of the office 
of President of the United States. Pursuant to Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge 
those powers and duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written declaration 
that I am able to resume the discharge of those powers and duties. 
Sincerely, 
GEORGE W. BUSH 
Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63676 
George W. Bush: Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary Transfer of the 
Powers and Duties of the President of the United States (July 21, 2007) 
Dear Madam Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:) 
This morning I will undergo a routine medical procedure requiring sedation. In view of 
present circumstances, I have determined to transfer temporarily my Constitutional 
powers and duties to the Vice President during the brief period of the procedure and 
recovery. 
In accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, this letter shall constitute my written declaration that I am 
unable to discharge the Constitutional powers and duties of the office of the President of 
the United States. Pursuant to Section 3, the Vice President shall discharge those powers 
and duties as Acting President until I transmit to you a written declaration that I am able to 
resume the discharge of those powers and duties. 
Sincerely, 
GEORGE W. BUSH 
Available at: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=75568 
“Every citizen should read this as surely as knowing where the EXIT signs are in case 
of emergency.” – Jane Mayer, The New Yorker
“The Yale Rule of Law Clinic’s ‘Reader’s Guide to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’ 
provides an extensive and thoughtful analysis of the Amendment’s provisions. 
This highly readable work is an important contribution to the scholarship on 
the 25th Amendment, and a valuable resource for the general public, experts, and 
government officials. Crises involving presidential succession and inability have 
caught the nation off guard and unprepared on several occasions. By navigating 
the amendment’s nuances before another crisis might implicate the Amendment, 
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government by advancing understanding of the Constitution. I commend them  
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